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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Australia, the number of instances inciting racial hatred and 
discrimination as well as threatening physical harm—towards people or their 
property—on the basis of race has surged in recent years.1  This trend is 
clearly reflected in the dramatic increase in civil complaints lodged with the 
Australian Human Rights Commission alleging racial hatred during the 
2012–2013 financial year.2  Some incidents of racial hostility have escalated 
to actual, racially-based attacks.  For example, the Executive Council of 
Australian Jewry (ECAJ) recorded 231 incidents of “racist violence” against 
Australian Jews from October 2012 to September 2013; representing the 
second highest total on record, and a 69% increase above the average of the 
previous twenty-three year reporting period.3  Australia’s peak intelligence 
                                                                                                                   
 1 There has been a noticeable increase in attacks on members of racial minority groups, 
including Jews, immigrants, and international students from China and India.  See Kate 
Warner, Sentencing Review 2009–2010, 34 CRIM L.J. 385 (2010); Gail Mason & Andrew 
Dwyer, ‘A Negation of Australia’s Fundamental Values’: Sentencing Prejudice-Motivated 
Crime, 36 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 871, 873 (2013); Dan Meagher, So Far So Good?: A 
Critical Evaluation of Racial Vilification Laws in Australia, 32 FED. L. REV. 225, 227 (2004); 
Gail Mason, ‘I am Tomorrow’: Violence Against Indian Students in Australia and Political 
Denial, 45(1) AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND J. CRIMINOLOGY 4, 5 (2012). 
 2 In the 2012–2013 financial year, 192 civil complaints were filed with the Australian 
Human Rights Commission alleging racial hatred under section 18C of the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA).  AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (AHRC), 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT: APRIL 2014 ¶ 67 (2014), available 
at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/20140428_RDA_submission.pdf.  This 
represents an almost 60% increase over the preceding year.  Much of the rise can be accounted 
for by material published in social media on the internet.  See Dr. Tim Soutphommasane, 
Racism is a Moral Issue, AHRC (2014), http://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/racis 
m-moral-issue.   
 3 These instances of violence encompassed “physical assault, vandalism—including 
through arson attacks—threatening phone calls, hate mail, graffiti, leaflets, posters, and 
abusive and intimidat[ing] electronic mail.”  JEREMY JONES, EXEC. COUNCIL OF AUSTRL. 
JEWRY, 2012 REPORT ON ANTISEMITISM IN AUSTRALIA 9 (2012), available at http://antisemitis 
m.org.il/webfm_send/59.  Racially based attacks against Jews in Australia invariably increase 
during periods of conflict in the Middle East.  JULIE NATHAN, EXEC. COUNCIL OF AUSTRL. 
JEWRY, 2014 REPORT ON ANTISEMITISM IN AUSTRALIA 15–16 (2014), available at http://www. 
ecaj.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2014_antisemitism_report.pdf.  Several incidents 
attracted significant media attention, such as a severe attack, perpetrated by a gang of youths, 
on a Jewish family walking home from a Sabbath dinner.  Sally Willoughby, Five People 
Hospitalised After Brawl in Bondi, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www. 
smh.com.au/nsw/five-people-hospitalised-after-brawl-in-bondi-20131026-2w80v.html.  New 
South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board President Stepan Kerkyasharian acknowledged the 
incident would be investigated as a case involving “severe racial vilification.”  Jewish 
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body, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), considers 
the Jewish community to be the top target of terrorism in Australia.4  The 
Muslim community has also been increasingly subjected to attacks in light of 
recent terror raids by federal police and events in Syria and Iraq.5   
A recent incident in the state of Queensland highlights the ongoing 
problem of racial intolerance.  A railway guard in Queensland was subjected 
to a torrent of racial abuse in the course of performing his duties.  The guard 
requested a passenger take his feet off a train seat, prompting the passenger 
                                                                                                                   
Community Reps Condemn Sydney Brawl, NEWS.COM.AU (Oct. 27, 2013, 1:46 PM), http:// 
www.news.com.au/national/breaking-news/jewish-community-reps-condemn-sydney-brawl/s 
tory-e6frfku9-1226747723206.  Although this is a criminal offense under existing state law in 
New South Wales, it never been prosecuted.  There are no commonwealth law offenses for 
severe racial vilification in Australia.  See infra notes 200–21 and accompanying text.  A more 
recent incident gaining media attention occurred on a bus in Sydney where a group of 
teenagers hurled anti-Semitic taunts, such as “Kill the Jews” and “Heil Hitler,” at  
approximately thirty Jewish children aged between five and twelve years old.  They also 
allegedly threatened to “slit the children’s throats.”  Jewish schools and places of worship 
were placed under heightened security after this incident.  Megan Levy, Teens Arrested Over 
Racist Attack on Bus Full of Jewish School Students, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 7, 
2014), http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/teens-arrested-over-racist-attack-on-bus-full-of-jewish-sc 
hool-students-20140807-101995.html; Ben McClellan et al., Jewish Schools in Lockdown 
After Bondi Race Hate Bus Attack, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.dailytelegr 
aph.com.au/news/nsw/jewish-schools-in-lockdown-after-bondi-race-hate-bus-attack/story-fni0 
cx12-1227017340546.   In March 2015, the federal government provided $18 million AUD to 
schools deemed to be at risk of racist incidents or terrorist attacks.  Jewish or Islamic schools 
make up over half of the fifty-four identified at risk schools nationwide.  The funds provided 
to the schools are to be used to employ security guards.  Shalailah Medhora, Schools at Risk of 
Racist or Terrorist Attack Given Funds to Employ Security Guards, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/mar/02/schools-at-risk-of-terrorist-or 
-racist-attack-given-funds-to-employ-security-guards. 
 4 JONES, supra note 3, at 75.  Very recently, in Europe, there has also been a significant 
rise in racist hate speech directed at Jews and in anti-Semitic violence forcing many Jews to 
migrate to Israel or consider leaving Europe.  These incidents have alarmed political leaders in 
the U.K., France, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland.  Julie Nathan, Antisemitism in the 21st 
Century, J-WIRE (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.jwire.com.au/antisemitism-21st-century-writes-
julie-nathan/. 
 5 In a three week period, there were thirty attacks on Muslims.  Most of these attacks 
involved damage to mosques, physical assaults and threats of violence against religious 
leaders and women wearing the hijab.  Heath Aston, Dozens of Anti-Muslim Attacks as 
Islamic Leaders Warn of Community Fear, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 9, 2014), 
available at http://www.smh.com.au/national/dozens-of-antimuslim-attacks-as-islamic-leader 
s-warn-of-community-fear-20141009-113tmk.html; Phil Mercer, Muslims Feel Violent 
Backlash After Australian Anti-Terror Raids, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www. 
voanews.com/content/muslims-feel-violent-backlash-after-australian-anti-terror-raids/248558 
5.html. 
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to call the guard a “nigger and a black dog.”  After the guard indicated the 
train would not leave the station until the offender exited the train, the 
offender asked the guard: “Do you want to come to Australia and learn some 
proper English?  Learn some fucking English cause this is Australia . . . I 
can’t understand you . . . Do you even have citizenship, you fucking nigger?”  
The racial abuse was recorded by a friend and subsequently posted on the 
alleged offender’s Facebook, which went viral and enabled him to be tracked 
down by police.6 
The growth in incidences of incitement to racial hatred and violence has 
taken place against a backdrop of widespread national debate on the utility of 
existing commonwealth racial vilification laws.7  In 2014, the newly elected 
Australian government proposed changes to section 18C of the 
commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (RDA), which drew 
                                                                                                                   
 6 Natalie Bochenski, Shocking Racist Attack on Queensland Rail Guard Goes Viral, 
BRISBANE TIMES (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/shocking-rac 
ist-attack-on-queensland-rail-guard-goes-viral-20141012-114v70.html; Natalie Bochenski, 
Alleged Train Abusers: Timeline of Social Media Sting, BRISBANE TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014), 
available at http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/alleged-train-abusers-timeline-of-a-
social-media-sting-20141012-1152r0.html; Brittany Vonow et al., Teenagers Charged Over 
Racist Attack on Security Guard on Brisbane Train, COURIER MAIL (Oct. 13, 2014), http:// 
www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/teenagers-charged-over-racist-attack-on-security-g 
uard-on-brisbane-train/story-fnihsrf2-1227088232685.  The Queensland Police Service 
indicated they would consult with the Department of Justice to consider, for the first time 
ever, bringing separate charges for severe racial vilification under Queensland legislation.  Id.  
This is significant because no individual has ever been prosecuted for severe vilification in 
Queensland. 
 7 An extensive study undertaken over a twelve year period by the Challenging Racism 
Project at the University of Western Sydney found that 84% of survey respondents 
acknowledged the existence of racism in Australia, one fifth indicated they have been subjected 
to verbal abuse, racial slurs, and name calling based on their race, and one in twenty Australians 
indicated they have been physically attacked because of their race.  Forty-one percent agreed that 
“Australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins sticking to their old ways.”  THE 
CHALLENGING RACISM PROJECT, NAT’L LEVEL FINDINGS 2, http://www.uws.edu.au/__data/asset 
s/pdf_file/0007/173635/NationalLevelFindingsV1.pdf.  In 2012, the AHRC conducted a survey 
as part of its National Anti-Racism Strategy.  One thousand five hundred eighty-four anonymous 
online surveys were completed.  The survey found 66% of those responding had experienced 
racism.  Ninety percent said racism is a very important or extremely important issue facing 
individuals and Australia as a whole.  AHRC, RACISM: IT STOPS WITH ME 4 (2013), available at 
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/WEB_RISWM_one_ye 
ar_on_report%20final.pdf; see also AHRC, NAT’L ANTI-RACISM STRATEGY: CONSULTATION 
REPORT (2012), https://itstopswithme.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/consultation_report. 
pdf.  This trend in Australia has been accompanied by a concomitant increase in the propagation 
of racist hate speech globally.  Kathleen Mahoney, Hate Speech, Equality, and the State of 
Canadian Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 321, 321 (2009). 
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extensive criticism from various groups and sectors of the community as 
evidenced by the large number of submissions made to a public inquiry 
conducted by the Attorney General.8  The widespread community uproar 
forced the government to defer making any changes to the current 
legislation.  Prime Minister Tony Abbott explained the decision to shelve the 
proposed changes: “When it comes to counter-terrorism, everyone needs to 
be part of team Australia . . . The government’s proposals . . . have become a 
complication in that respect.  I don’t want to do anything that puts our 
national unity at risk at this time, so those proposals are now off the table.”9  
Physical threats to persons or property involving racial animus are referred to 
in existing Australian state and territory legislation as serious or severe racial 
vilification.  No comparable commonwealth law attracts criminal penalties.10  
The disturbing trend towards racial intolerance and animosity, as well as 
the national debate on proposed changes to the existing commonwealth laws 
dealing with racial vilification, brings into sharp focus a number of 
interrelated issues: How are these matters currently dealt with in the 
Australian legal system at the federal and state levels?  Should cases of 
inciting racial discrimination, racial hatred, and severe vilification be dealt 
with in the criminal justice system, through civil mechanisms, or both?  
Should these incidents be prosecuted as specific hate crimes or should such 
cases be handled under existing criminal laws?  What policy objectives are 
furthered by prosecuting these occurrences as hate crimes?  Is Australia 
complying with its international legal obligations? 
This Article will argue that several factors justify prosecuting these 
activities as specific hate crimes under federal criminal laws.  First, 
international treaties to which Australia is a party require the creation of 
specific criminal offenses to address circumstances involving the 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to 
racial hatred, contempt or discrimination, threats or incitement to violence, as 
well as the provision of assistance to racist activities (including financing).  
Second, the main justifications in support of free speech do not justify 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Latika Bourke, Government Sifts Through Racial Discrimination Act Submissions as 
Institute of Public Affairs Says Immediate Action Needed, ABC NEWS (July 4, 2014), http:// 
www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-04/changes-to-racial-discrimination-act-put-on-hold/5571478. 
 9 Stephanie Anderson, Proposed Changes to Racial Discrimination Act ‘Off the Table,’ 
SBS NEWS (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/08/05/proposed-changes 
-racial-discrimination-act-table. 
 10 See Gail Mason, Hate Crime Laws in Australia: Are They Achieving Their Goals?, 33 
CRIM. L.J. 326 (2009); see infra notes 158, 194. 
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protecting speech inciting racial discrimination, hatred, and violence.  Third, 
there are fundamental human rights principles, such as the right to dignity 
and equality, which translate into the need for racial minorities to live in the 
community free from fear of hostility and violence.  Regulating this conduct 
as a hate crime fosters social cohesion by promoting tolerance of diversity in 
a multicultural society.  Fourth, the purposes of racial vilification laws may 
not currently be achieved through existing state and commonwealth 
legislative schemes.  Finally, a lacuna exists in Australian criminal law in 
relation to offenses proscribing racial violence and hate speech.  Coupled 
with this is the issue of adequacy of general offense aggravation provisions.  
The cumulative effect of these arguments is a proposal for specific criminal 
law reforms to bring Australia into compliance with international law, to 
further the objectives of hate crime legislation, and to establish an effective 
system for enforcement of such legislation. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
A.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to set a standard for the global 
promotion of human rights.11  Article 19 of the UDHR protects freedom of 
expression: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/217 
%28III%29.  Eight states abstained from voting on this Resolution.  UDHR Voting Record, 
UNBISNET, http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?&profile=voting&uri=full=3100023~ 
!909326~!0&ri=1&aspect=power&menu=search&source=~!horizon.  The UDHR received 
such widespread support because General Assembly resolutions are not binding under 
international law and there was no process set up in the UDHR to implement its provisions.  
Nonetheless, the UDHR set a standard by which to measure a government’s treatment of its 
own citizens.  Alan Berman, International Human Rights Law and New Zealand’s Foreign 
Relations: A Comparative Study of New Zealand’s Relations with South Africa and Iran, 12 
U. HAW. L. REV. 283 n.6 (1990).  Former Australian Foreign Minister H.V. Evatt was 
President of the UN General Assembly at the time the UDHR was adopted.  See Gillian 
Triggs, President, Austl. Hum. Rts. Comm., Address at the Australian Public Service and 
Human Rights Network (Oct. 29, 2012), available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/ 
speeches/aps-human-rights-network-speech-prof-gillian-triggs-2012. 
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receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers.”12  
This right is qualified by a general limitation clause in Article 29(2):  
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely 
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare 
in a democratic society.13 
International treaties to which Australia is a party, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),14 recognize 
                                                                                                                   
 12 UDHR, supra note 11, pmbl.  The UDHR was adopted after the establishment of the 
U.N.  Member states were concerned with avoiding a repeat of the atrocities of World War II.  
This concern is reflected in the preamble of the resolution:  
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous 
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a 
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and 
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of 
the common people. 
Id.  The UDHR is now considered to have the force of customary international law.  See Hurst 
Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 319 (1996); Kristen E. Boon, The United 
Nations As Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341, 385 n.182 
(2016).  
 13 UDHR, supra note 11, art. 29(2).  Earlier wording of the UDHR suggests the drafters 
thought the right to freedom of expression does not entail the right to incite racial hatred.  
Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of 
International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1996).  Most of 
the drafters believed that Article 29(2), along with Article 7 recognizing the right of all to 
equal protection against incitement to discrimination in violation of the UDHR, permitted 
limitations on the advocacy of racial hatred.  Id. at 12–14; see also Robin Edger, Are Hate 
Speech Provisions Anti-Democratic?: An International Perspective, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
119, 126–27 (2010). 
 14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar. 23, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ ccpr.aspx.  
This treaty, absent Article 41, entered into force in Australia on Aug. 13, 1980.  See U.N. Treaty 
Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, https://treaties.un. 
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en.  Article 41 came 
into force on Jan. 28, 1993.  Id.  Australia is a signatory to both the ICCPR as well as the First 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 
(Mar. 23, 1976), available at http:// www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1. 
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that the right to freedom of expression is not unbridled.15  The exercise of 
such a right carries with it special responsibilities including, but not limited 
to, respecting the rights of others and safeguarding public order.16  The 
ICCPR recognizes that the right to freedom of expression is abused if 
exercised in a manner designed to destroy the rights of others, and in such 
circumstances, the right can be legally restricted.17  Article 19 stipulates that: 
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference. 
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
                                                                                                                   
aspx.  The Optional Protocol took effect in Australia on Sept. 25, 1991.  See U.N. Treaty 
Collection, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetai ls.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en.  
The Optional Protocol allows the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) to 
consider communications from persons alleging their rights under the ICCPR have been violated.  
See Katherine Gelber, Free Speech Hate Speech and an Australian Bill of Rights, 2 DRAWING 
BD: AUSTL. REV. PUB. AFF. 107, 111 n.16 (2002).  State signatories accept the ability of the 
UNHRC to entertain such communications.  Id.; see also Alan Berman, The Experiences of 
Denying Constitutional Protection to Sodomy Laws in the United States, Australia and 
Malaysia: You’ve Come A Long Way Baby And You Still Have a Long Way to Go, OXFORD U. 
COMP. L. FORUM (2008), http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/berman2.shtml#fn302sym. 
 15 For example, some scholars point to Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR, which were 
drafted within the wider historical context of the atrocities committed during World War II, as 
evidence of the content and parameters of permissible limitations to the right to freedom of 
expression.  See Expert Seminar on the Links between articles 19 and 20 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Freedom of Expression and Advocacy of Religious 
Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Geneva, Oct. 2–3, 2008, Articles 19 and 
20 of the ICCPR, Conf. Room Paper No. 3 [hereinafter Ghanea], available at http://www. 
ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Seminar2008/CompilationConferenceRoomP
apers.pdf (by Nazila Ghanea); Christian Tomuschat, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW (2008), http://legal. 
un.org/avl/pdf/ha/iccpr/iccpr_e.pdf. 
 16 Hate crime laws are designed to maintain public order not simply by averting violence 
but also by “upholding against attack a shared, public sense of the basic elements of each 
person’s status, dignity, and reputation as a citizen or member of society in good standing—
particularly against attacks predicated upon the characteristics of some particular social 
group.”  Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1596, 1605 (2010). 
 17 See Farrior, supra note 13, at 3–5 (providing a detailed account of the drafting history of 
the UDHR, ICCPR, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination). 
2015] RACIAL HATE SPEECH REGULATION  53 
 
 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice. 
(3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of 
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It 
may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall 
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For 
respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the 
protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), 
or of public health or morals.18 
The drafters of the ICCPR recognized that hate speech would weaken 
individual rights and progressively erode fundamental democratic values.19  
The best way to protect the principle of freedom of expression is to recognize 
that certain forms of expression are dangerous to the freedom itself.  Banning 
racist hate speech is an acceptable restriction on freedom of expression 
because such speech is intended to defeat the rights of its targets—by 
silencing their free speech—and undercuts the most basic principles 
underlying international human rights law: equality and non-discrimination. 
Some jurisdictions, such as Canada, have expressly recognized that 
equality rights co-exist with the right to freedom of expression.  The Supreme 
Court of Canada has upheld federal criminal laws prohibiting hate 
propaganda—e.g., public incitement of racial hatred likely to result in a breach 
of the peace and willful promotion of hatred—by recognizing that the right of 
freedom of expression does not enjoy primacy over equality rights.20  Both 
                                                                                                                   
 18 ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 19.  The author recognizes repressive regimes have in the past 
used the public order exception in Article 19 as a loophole to suppress dissent by restricting 
the free expression of ideas.  One of the problems with the language of Article 19 is that states 
can decide when particular restrictions are warranted.  See Farrior, supra note 13, at 7 n.30 
(noting South Africa’s use of the limitations clause as an example of such abuse). 
 19 Farrior, supra note 13, at 9. 
 20 R v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (concluding advocacy of racial hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence represents an attack on equality 
rights).  This also seems to be the position embraced by the U.N. Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD Committee).  UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ICERD Comm., General Recommendation No. 35: 
Combating Racist Hate Speech, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter 
General Recommendation No. 35], available at http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/Files 
Handler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhssyNNtgI51ma08CMa6o7Bglz8iG4SuOjov
EP%2bcqr8joDoVEbW%2bQ1MoWdOTNEV99v6FZp9aSSA1nZya6gtpTo2JUBMI0%2boO
mjAwk%2b2xJW%2bC8e (“Freedom of expression should not aim at the destruction of the 
rights and freedoms of others, including the right to equality and non-discrimination.”); cf. 
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fundamental rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
are indivisible.21  For this reason, restrictions on racist hate speech actually 
foster, rather than impede, free expression by disallowing speech that is likely 
to silence the free speech rights of the targeted racial group.22  Thus, rather 
than inhibiting free speech, such regulations simply reflect a more subtle and 
sophisticated understanding of the right to freedom of expression.23 
The ICCPR requires states to prohibit certain types of hate speech.  
Article 20(2) provides: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law.”24  This provision has proven to be contentious in the 
international community.  Some view the prohibition in Article 20(2) as 
excessively restrictive of free speech since incitement to discrimination sets a 
relatively low threshold for the prohibition of speech.25  Others have pointed 
to the limited classifications of hate speech actually covered by this 
provision.26  Nevertheless, Article 20(2) only requires states to prohibit 
statements promoting racial hatred that constitute incitement27 to racial 
“discrimination, hostility or violence.”28  
                                                                                                                   
Farrior, supra note 13, at 5–6 (suggesting the principle of equality and non-discrimination 
enjoys precedence over the right to freedom of expression).   
 21 R v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.; See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 346.   
 24 ICCPR, supra note 14.  While some countries with hate speech regulations have relied 
upon them to suppress political dissent, many countries have not done so.  Farrior, supra note 
13, at 32 n.195; see also FRANCES D’SARZA & KEVIN BOYLE, STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE 
SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 44 (Sandra Colver ed., 1992).   
 25 During the drafting of Article 20(2), some thought prohibiting hate speech would violate 
the right to freedom of expression.  Farrior, supra note 13, at 8–17.  Debate on this Article 
was contentious.  Id. 
 26 See Ghanea, supra note 15; Hate Speech: What do We do, ARTICLE 19, http://www.artic 
le19.org/pages/en/hate-speech-more.html. 
 27 Some commentators have suggested that incitement focuses on the intent or actual 
impact of the speech in prompting one spectator to harm another individual or group.  
Professor Susan Benesch persuasively reasons that incitement to discrimination, hostility, or 
violence exists if speech seeks to “provoke reactions (perlocutionary acts) on the part of the 
audience . . . . When inflammatory speech inspires one audience to harm another person or 
group . . . successful incitement [has been established].”  Expert Workshops on the Prohibition 
on Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, Feb. 9–10, 2011, Contribution to 
OHCHR Initiative on Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, at 4 [hereinafter 
Benesch], available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Others20 
11/SBenesch.doc (by Susan Benesch).   
 28 ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 20(2).  It is highly debatable whether statements promoting 
racial hatred are, at the very least, likely to concurrently incite racial discrimination.  See 
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The U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has expressly indicated 
the right of free speech in Article 19 of the ICCPR does not offer protection 
for spreading “racial or religious hatred.”29  In J.R.T. and the W.G. Party v. 
Canada, the founder of a political party in Canada made a complaint to the 
UNHRC alleging violation of his right to free expression contained in Article 
19 of the ICCPR.30  The complainant disseminated the policies of his party in 
pre-recorded messages which could be accessed by members of the public by 
telephoning the party office.31  The messages cautioned listeners of the 
“dangers of international finance and international Jewry leading the world 
into wars, unemployment and inflation and the collapse of world values and 
principles.”32  The UNHRC found the anti-Semitic opinions disseminated 
through the telephone system constituted the advocacy of racial hatred.33  For 
                                                                                                                   
MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 
475 (2d ed. 2005). 
 29 Faurisson v. France, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 550/1993, ¶¶ 9.5–9.7, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (Dec. 16, 1996).  In Faurisson, the UNHRC upheld the Gayssot 
Act, a 1990 French law making it an offense to trivialize crimes against humanity committed 
by the Nazis during World War II.  The law was passed in response to revisionist accounts of 
Nazi war crimes by historians.  The government viewed these revisionist accounts as “a subtle 
form of contemporary anti-Semitism.”  Id. ¶ 7.2.  Faurisson, a former literature professor at 
the prestigious Sorbonne in Paris, was convicted under the Gassyot Act for expressing 
skepticism towards the use of gas chambers in Nazi concentration camps to exterminate Jews.  
He also criticized the judgment at Nuremburg as a judicial sham.  Id. ¶ 7.3.  The UNHRC 
found this to be an unlawful attack on the reputation and the memory of the victims of 
Nazism.  Accordingly, the UNHRC held the French law was justified under Article 19(3)(a) to 
protect the rights and reputation of others.  The restriction on Faurisson’s free speech rights 
was necessary to protect the Jewish community to live “free from fear of an atmosphere of 
anti-Semitism.”  Id. ¶ 9.6.  The UNHRC also indicated the state requirement imposed by 
Article 20 is not incompatible with the right to freedom of expression in Article 19.  Id. ¶ 9.7; 
see also Gelber, supra note 14, at 107.  
 30 J.R.T. v. Canada, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 104/1981, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/2 (July 18, 1981).  The relevant Canadian law prohibited discriminatory 
telephonic messages of any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or 
contempt on the grounds, inter alia, of race and religion.  Id. ¶ 2.2.  The Canadian Human 
Rights Commission allowed a complaint by Jewish groups alleging a breach of the relevant 
legislation.  Id. ¶ 2.4.  This decision was later enforced by the Canadian Federal Court against 
the founding member of the political party, who then submitted a complaint to the UNHRC 
alleging a violation of his free speech rights under Article 19(1) and (2) of the ICCPR.  Id. 
¶ 2.5.  The UNHRC found Canada was not in breach of these provisions.  Instead, the 
Committee found the author’s communication of racist ideas to be inconsistent with the 
provisions of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR.  Id. ¶ 8. 
 31 Id. ¶ 2.1. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. ¶ 8(b). 
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this reason, the racist ideas communicated were not protected by Article 19.34  
Indeed, the UNHRC found Canada has a duty under Article 20(2) of the 
ICCPR to prohibit the spreading of such racist ideas.35  This case illustrates: 
(a) the right to free speech is not absolute; and (b) domestic laws 
implementing the obligations of Article 20(2) are entirely consistent with the 
right to freedom of expression contained in Article 19, the exercise of which 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities.36  Some commentators have 
suggested the UNHRC’s comments imply that states ratifying the ICCPR 
should enact laws criminalizing the promotion of racial hatred.37  Others 
have pointed to the terms in Article 20(2) as allowing state compliance 
through the provision of civil remedies or criminal penalties.38  
B.  The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) covers a wider range of hate speech than Article 20 
of the ICCPR, and is more explicit in mandating that State parties declare as 
an offense certain types of racial hate speech.  The ICERD penalizes certain 
hate speech to deter actions that foster or incite racial discrimination.39  
Article 4(a) compels state parties to establish an offense for the following: 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Farrior, supra note 13, at 50, 91; Edger, supra note 13, at 134–36. 
 37 Expert Workshops on the Prohibition on Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, 
Nairobi, Apr. 6–7, 2011, Background paper on Australia’s Response to Articles 19 and 20 of the 
ICCPR, at 2–4 [hereinafter Gelber Background Paper], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/engli 
sh/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/expert_papers_Bangkok/KATH_GELBER.pdf (by 
Gelber).  The Concluding Observations of the UNHRC to Australia’s Fifth Report under the 
ICCPR note Australia’s existing federal laws regulating hate speech that contain only civil 
remedies are insufficient to meet the obligations of Article 20.  Id. at 3 n.10.  This also implies 
Australia must adopt criminal sanctions for advocacy of racial hatred that constitutes incitement 
to hostility or violence.  Id. at 3–4; see also Benesch, supra note 27.  
 38 Ghanea, supra note 15.  Some have suggested that sanctioning someone with imprisonment 
for advocacy of racial hatred that incites racial discrimination or hostility rather than violence 
might violate the sentencing principle of proportionality, particularly since incarceration 
potentially jeopardizes many other human rights.  Farrior, supra note 13, at 11, 92–93.  The 
ICERD Committee, however, seems to have rejected this interpretation.  See infra note 48. 
 39 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. 
Res. 2106(XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (Dec. 21, 1965), available at http:// 
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx [hereinafter ICERD].  This treaty, 
which entered into force in Australia on Sept. 30, 1975, has 177 parties and 87 signatures.  See 
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State Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations 
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race 
or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which 
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in 
any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive 
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, 
such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the 
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this 
Convention,40 inter alia:  
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of 
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of 
persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the 
provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the 
financing thereof.41 
Article 4(a) thus prohibits the following acts: 
(1) all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority;42 
                                                                                                                   
U.N. Treaty Collection, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-2&ch 
apter=4&lang=en.  
 40 The due regard clause incorporates all of the rights in the UDHR.  Some states, such as 
the U.S., have construed this clause as not requiring governmental actions which inhibit the 
right to freedom of speech and association.  The ICERD Committee has rejected this 
interpretation of the due regard clause, holding that states cannot rely on the clause to justify 
deviating from the compulsory obligations in Article 4.  General Recommendation No. 35, 
supra note 20, ¶ 19 (“The due regard clause has been interpreted by the Committee to apply to 
human rights and freedoms as a whole, and not simply to freedom of opinion and 
expression.”).  The Committee has also noted that the due regard clause relates to all of the 
principles in the UDHR.  See infra note 48.  For this reason, placing less emphasis on the right 
to freedom of speech in circumstances involving racist hate speech does not render the due 
regard clause inconsequential, particularly since all treaties recognizing the right to freedom of 
expression provide that this right can be abridged in certain instances.  
 41 ICERD, supra note 39, art. 4(a). 
 42 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights drafted the ICCPR and ICERD, and 
subsequently appointed two Special Rapporteurs to engage in a wide-ranging study of the 
right to freedom of expression.  Farrior, supra note 13, at 87–89.  The right to be meaningfully 
informed has been cited as one justification by these Special Rapporteurs for banning the 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority.  Id. at 91 n.559.  Criminal sanctions for 
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(2) all dissemination of ideas based on racial hatred; 
(3) incitement to racial discrimination;  
(4) acts of violence against any race or group or persons of 
another colour or ethnic group;  
(5)  incitement to such acts; and 
(6) the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including 
the financing thereof. 
Domestic legislation is required to implement the requirements of the 
ICERD; even in instances where other laws penalize some of the same acts, 
such as assault, affray and intimidation.43  The Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD Committee) is the body responsible for 
overseeing the domestic implementation of the ICERD.  The ICERD 
Committee has explicitly recognized that banning certain types of racist hate 
speech is entirely consistent with promoting a robust right to freedom of 
expression.44 
                                                                                                                   
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred have been passed by some states, 
and a majority of the ICERD Committee has indicated this category of speech should be 
criminalized.  Nevertheless, some states have not passed domestic implementing legislation in 
relation to this category of speech.  Id. at 57.  Other state parties to the ICERD, such as the 
U.K., Canada, New Zealand, France, Denmark and Germany have enacted criminal offenses 
for acts of racial hatred or the dissemination of racist ideas inciting racial discrimination or 
hatred.  Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a 
Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 521–23 (2009).  These prohibitions were 
traditionally intended to prevent the incitement of violence.  Id.  More recently, these laws 
have been enacted in reliance on the obligations flowing from international treaties, such as 
the ICCPR and the ICERD.  Id.; see also Louise Johns, Racial Vilification and ICERD in 
Australia, 2 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. 2–3 (1995); Edger, supra note 13, at 145–49; infra 
note 164. 
 43 Johns, supra note 42, at 2. 
 44 Banning racist hate speech is entirely consistent with freedom of expression in that the 
two are  
complementary and not the expression of a zero sum game where the priority 
given to one necessitates the diminution of the other.  The rights to equality 
and freedom from discrimination, and the right to freedom of expression, 
should be fully reflected in law, policy and practice as mutually supportive 
human rights. 
General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 20, ¶ 45.  The ICERD Committee is empowered 
to consider complaints from individuals or groups of individuals within its jurisdiction 
alleging to be a victim of a violation of their rights under this treaty provided a state 
declaration has been issued recognizing the competence of the ICERD Committee to consider 
such communications.  ICERD, supra note 39, art. 14(1).  
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Most of the experts comprising the ICERD Committee are of the view 
that Article 4(a) refers to criminal offenses.  This view is partially due to an 
understanding that the protracted nature of civil litigation would prove of 
limited utility in serving the goals of deterrence and punishment required to 
successfully guard the community from racial discrimination.45  Moreover, 
the ICERD Committee has indicated that available civil penalties do not 
fulfill the obligations under the treaty.46 
This view is consistent with the language of the ICERD.  While Article 
20(2) requires states to “prohibit” the advocacy of racial hatred that incites 
discrimination, hostility or violence, Article 4(a) contains the words 
“punishable by law.”  This language arguably compels states to establish 
criminal punishment for disseminating ideas based on racial superiority or 
hatred, acts of racial violence, and incitement to racial discrimination and 
violence.47  For example, the ICERD Committee held in Jewish Community 
of Oslo v. Norway48 that failure to convict the leader of a Neo-Nazi group 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Farrior, supra note 13; Edger, supra note 13, at 135.   
 46 Although the ICERD Committee is also of the view that intent is not an essential element 
in establishing an offense under Article 4, approximately thirty states require intent to 
disseminate ideas of racial superiority or hatred to establish criminal liability.  Farrior, supra 
note 13, at 57. 
 47 Johns, supra note 42, at 2–3. 
 48 Jewish Community of Oslo v. Norway, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No., 30/2003, 
UN Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (Aug. 15, 2005).  In 2002, the Supreme Court of Norway 
acquitted Terje Sjolie, the leader of Bootboys, a Neo-Nazi group, for racist statements made at 
an unauthorized march to commemorate the Nazi leader Rudolph Hess.  Sjolie declared “our 
people and country are being plundered and destroyed by the Jews, who suck our country 
empty of wealth and replace it with immoral and un-Norwegian thoughts.”  Id. ¶ 2.1.  The 
Supreme Court overruled a Court of Appeal conviction of Sjolie under section 135a of the 
Norwegian Penal Code prohibiting a person from “threatening, insulting, or subjecting to 
hatred, persecution or contempt, any person or group of persons because of their . . . race.”  Id. 
¶ 2.5.  The Court of Appeal concluded the speech could be understood as accepting the mass 
extermination of Jews, however, the Supreme Court found the statements were merely Nazi 
rhetoric—expressing at most support for the National Socialist ideology rather than 
advocating organized violence against Jews.  Thus, while the Supreme Court found the 
statements derogatory and offensive, the court held that punishing such statements was 
incompatible with the right to free speech since no actual threats were made nor were orders 
given to carry out threats.  Id. ¶ 2.7.  Contrary to the finding of the Supreme Court, the ICERD 
Committee found Article 4 of the ICERD requires states to prohibit the dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred.  Moreover, the Committee noted other international 
bodies give less protection to freedom of speech in cases of racist hate speech.  As such, the 
Committee found Sjolie’s acquittal constituted a violation of Articles 4 and 6 of the ICERD, 
since his statements contained ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, as well as incitement 
to racial discrimination or violence.  Id. ¶¶ 10.1–.6 
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under Norway’s domestic criminal laws for statements involving ideas based 
on racial superiority or hatred as well as incitement to racial discrimination, 
if not violence, constitutes a violation of Articles 4 and 6 of the ICERD.49 
General Recommendation No. 35, adopted by the ICERD Committee in 
2013, deals with combating racist hate speech.50  It notes that the high 
incidence of racist hate speech globally poses a substantial risk to the 
promotion of human rights.  Implementing the obligations of the ICERD 
holds the greatest promise of both “translating the vision of a society free 
from intolerance and hatred into a living reality and promoting a culture of 
respect for universal human rights.”51    
The Recommendation notes the obligatory and essential nature of Article 
4 in addressing racial discrimination through punitive measures in instances 
                                                                                                                   
  In 2004, two years after the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, section 100 of the 
Norwegian Constitution was amended to empower the Parliament to pass laws prohibiting 
racist speech in compliance with its international treaty obligations.  The Norwegian 
government subsequently amended section 135a of the General Civil Penal Code to extend 
criminal liability to negligent statements, and increased the penalty from two years to three 
years imprisonment.  See id. ¶ 8.5.  The code now reads: 
  Section 135a:  
Any person who wilfully or through gross negligence publicly utters a 
discriminatory or hateful expression shall be liable to fines or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding three years.  An expression that is uttered in such a 
way that it is likely to reach a large number of persons shall be deemed 
equivalent to a publicity uttered expression.  The use of symbols shall also be 
deemed to be an expression.  Any person who aids and abets such an offence 
shall be liable to the same penalty.   
 A discriminatory or hateful expression here means threatening or 
insulting anyone, or inciting hatred or persecution of or contempt for anyone 
because of his or her (a) skin colour or national or ethnic origin, (b) religion 
or life stance, or (c) homosexuality, lifestyle or orientation. 
Act of 22 May 1902 No. 10, The General Civil Penal Code as amended by Act of 21 
December 2005 No. 131, Norwegian Ministry of Justice Legislation Department at 57 (2006) 
(unofficial translation) (internal citation omitted), available at http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulov 
data/lov-19020522-010-eng.pdf. 
 49 See Jewish Community of Oslo v. Norway, supra note 48, ¶¶ 10.1–.6. 
 50 The ICERD Committee noted that “[r]acist hate speech can take many forms and is not 
confined to explicitly racial remarks” but can include:  
indirect language [employed] . . . to disguise its targets and 
objectives . . . emanating from individuals or groups . . . orally or in print, or 
disseminated through electronic media, including the Internet and social 
networking sites, as well as non-verbal forms of expression such as the 
display of racist symbols, images and behaviour at public gatherings, 
including sporting events. 
 General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 20, at 19. 
 51 Id. at 10. 
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when prevention and deterrence fail. The provision serves an important 
symbolic function in highlighting the global community’s revulsion to racist 
hate speech—which repudiates the central doctrines of human dignity and 
equality, and demeans the social status of persons and groups in the wider 
community.52  The ICERD Committee makes specific recommendations 
regarding the circumstances in which racist hate speech should be subject to 
criminal sanctions:   
The Committee recommends that the criminalization of forms 
of racist expression should be reserved for serious cases, to be 
proven beyond reasonable doubt, while less serious cases 
should be addressed by means other than criminal law, taking 
into account, inter alia, the nature and extent of the impact on 
targeted persons and groups.  The application of criminal 
sanctions should be governed by principles of legality, 
proportionality and necessity . . . the Committee recommends 
that the States parties declare and effectively sanction as 
offences punishable by law: 
 
(a) All dissemination of ideas based on racial or ethnic 
superiority or hatred, by whatever means; 
(b) Incitement to hatred, contempt or discrimination 
against members of a group on grounds of their race, 
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin; 
(c) Threats or incitement to violence against persons or 
groups on the grounds in (b) above;  
(d) Expression of insults, ridicule or slander of persons 
or groups or justification of hatred, contempt or 
discrimination on the grounds in (b) above, when it 
clearly amounts to incitement to hatred or 
discrimination; 
(e) Participation in organizations and activities which 
promote and incite racial discrimination.53 
The Committee also indicated that five elements54 should be considered 
in determining whether certain conduct should be criminally proscribed as a 
                                                                                                                   
 52 Id. at 46. 
 53 Id. at 13. 
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dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred and as incitement 
to hatred, contempt, or discrimination: the content and form of speech;55 the 
prevailing economic, social, and political climate;56 the position or social 
status of the speaker in influencing public opinion;57 the reach of the 
speech;58 and the objectives of the speech.59    
Australia ratified the ICERD in 1974 and the ICCPR in 1980, both 
subject to reservations.60  Australia’s reservation to the ICERD evinced their 
intent to pass domestic implementation legislation as soon as practicable: 
The Government of Australia . . . declares that Australia is not 
at present in a position specifically to treat as offences all the 
matters covered by Article 4 (a) of the Convention.  Acts of the 
kind there mentioned are punishable only to the extent 
                                                                                                                   
 54 Id. at 15. 
 55 This factor considers whether the speech is confrontational and direct, the means by 
which the speech is disseminated, and the mode in which it is delivered.  Id. 
 56 Existing local configurations of discrimination against ethnic and other groups are to be 
considered.  Communications which in some situations may be harmless can have grave 
meaning in other contexts. Id. 
 57 For example, politicians and other persons enjoying high social status can have an 
influence in generating an adverse environment for particular racial groups.  Though the right 
to freedom of expression in relation to political matters is recognized, the Committee stresses 
that the exercise of this right carries with it special responsibilities.  Id. 
 58 This includes the makeup of the audience, the mode of communication (e.g., via the 
internet or mainstream media), and the regularity of the communication that might suggest a 
calculated tactic to provoke racial or ethnic hostility. Id. 
 59 Speech safeguarding the human rights of individuals and groups should not be subject to 
criminal or civil sanctions. Id. 
 60 Some scholars have been extremely skeptical of Australia’s ratification of treaties with 
reservations.  For example, Neil Löfgren has suggested that Australia ratifies many 
international treaties to showcase its staunch support for the promotion of human rights, while 
simultaneously evading its obligations under such treaties indirectly through the use of 
reservations.  See Neil Lofgren, Keeping the Colonisers Honest: The Implications of 
Recommendation 333, in MAJAH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THE LAW 88 (G. Bird et al. eds., 
1996).  The U.S. has deployed a similar strategy and has made reservations disclaiming any 
obligation to implement the provisions of Article 20 of the ICCPR and Articles 4 and 7 of the 
ICERD—to the extent such laws would the restrict the right of free speech protected by the 
U.S. Constitution.  U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations: International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (1992); U.S. Reservations, 
Understandings, and Declarations: International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REC. S7634-02 (1994); see also Stanley Halpin, Racial 
Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of International Human Rights Law Upon 
The Law of the United Kingdom and the United States, 94 MARQUETTE L. REV. 463, 488–90 
(2010). 
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provided by the existing criminal law dealing with such matters 
as the maintenance of public order, public mischief, assault, 
riot, criminal libel, conspiracy and attempts.  It is the intention 
of the Australian Government, at the first suitable moment, to 
seek from Parliament legislation specifically implementing the 
terms of Article 4 (a).61 
Australia’s more recent reservation to the ICCPR indicates Australia may 
not introduce any further domestic laws to implement its obligations under 
Article 20: 
Australia interprets the rights provided for by articles 19, 21 
and 22 as consistent with article 20; accordingly, the 
Commonwealth and the constituent states, having legislated 
with respect to the subject matter of the article in matters of 
practical concern in the interest of public order (ordre public), 
the right is reserved not to introduce any further legislative 
provision on these matters.62 
C.  Legislative Attempts to Implement International Treaty Obligations 
Past proposals to implement Australia’s ICERD obligations through 
domestic legislation have proven fruitless.63  In 1992, the Australian 
government introduced a bill containing criminal offenses designed to give 
effect to some of Australia’s obligations under Article 4(a) of the ICERD.64  
The move to enact federal vilification laws was influenced by three national 
                                                                                                                   
 61 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Australian Reservations, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (Oct. 7, 1966), available at https://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en. 
 62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Australian Reservations, 1197 
U.N.T.S. 411 (Aug. 13, 1980), available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetilas.aspx?src 
=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec. 
 63 Gelber Background Paper, supra note 37, at 2; LUKE MCNAMARA, REGULATING RACISM: 
RACIAL VILIFICATION LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 304–05 (2002).  Efforts to include provisions 
proscribing racial hatred were rejected at the time the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination 
Act (RDA) was passed in 1975.  Similarly, attempts in the 1980s to supplement the RDA with 
provisions proscribing racial hatred and racial defamation were unsuccessful.  See Luke 
McNamara & Tamsin Solomon, The Commonwealth Racial Hatred Act 1996: Achievement or 
Disappointment, 18 ADEL L. REV. 259, 262–65 (1996). 
 64 Gelber Background Paper, supra note 37, at 3; McNamara & Solomon, supra note 63, at 
263–64.  
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reports written in 1991–1992: the National Inquiry into Racist Violence;65 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody;66 and the 
Australian Law Reform Commission report on Multiculturalism and the 
Law.67  Each of these reports recognized the widespread problem of racial 
vilification and violence in Australia, though only the National Inquiry into 
Racist Violence recommended enactment of a criminal offense to address 
racist violence and intimidation as well as incitement to racist violence and 
racial hatred likely to lead to violence.68  
The original Racial Discrimination Amendment Bill 1992 proposed two 
criminal offenses based on inciting racial hatred and violence.69  The 
language in this bill was substantially similar to the wording in the state anti-
discrimination law in New South Wales’ Anti-Discrimination Act 1977.70  
                                                                                                                   
 65 AUSTRL. HUM. RTS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM., RACIST VIOLENCE: REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO RACIST VIOLENCE IN AUSTRALIA (1991) [hereinafter HREOC 
REPORT], available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publicati 
on/NIRV.pdf (recommending federal civil offenses be established against racial harassment, 
incitement to racial hostility, and racial violence and racial hatred likely to lead to violence).  
The HREOC report viewed incitement of racial hostility as less serious than racist violence 
and intimidation.  Id. at 300. 
 66 ELLIOT JOHNSTON, VOL. 4, AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION INTO ABORIGINAL DEATHS IN 
CUSTODY: NATIONAL REPORT (1991), available at http://www.healthinfonet.ecu.edu.au/key-re 
sources/bibliography?lid=10265 (click “View Report” to download) [hereinafter ABORIGINAL 
REPORT].  The Aboriginal Report recommended federal civil legislation modeled on Article 
20 of the ICCPR, and advocated for the enactment of a federal civil offense making racial 
vilification unlawful.  Racial vilification would involve speech that amounted to “racial 
violence, discrimination or hostility.”  Id. at 28.3.31. 
 67 AUSTRL. LAW REFORM COMM., REPORT NO. 57, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE LAW 
(1992), available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/alrc57.pdf 
(recommending the enactment of a federal law carrying civil penalties for incitement to racial 
hatred and hostility). 
 68 HREOC REPORT, supra note 65, at 390–92.  McNamara & Solomon, supra note 63, at 
261–63; Tim Wilson, Opponents Speak with Mixed Voices, AUSTRALIAN (Aug. 9, 2014), 
available at http://www.timwilson.com.au/articles/opponents-speak-with-mixed-voices-the-au 
stralian. 
 69 Racial Discrimination Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth) [hereinafter RDA 1992], available at 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2F
billsdgs%2F9I410%22.  The bill proposed amending the Crimes Act 1914 by inserting a new 
Part IVA, titled “Racial Incitement.”  Id. at 4.  The bill proposed criminalizing “racial 
incitement,” which is defined as “knowingly perform[ing] a public act that is racially offensive 
with the intention of stirring up hatred against a person or group of people on the grounds of 
race, colour or racial or ethnic origin.”  Id.  It also proposed making it an offense to perform an 
act with the intention of causing “persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin 
to fear that violence may be used against them or other persons of such a group.”  Id. 
 70 McNamara & Solomon, supra note 63, at 263–64. 
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The 1992 bill also recommended adding a civil provision for acts likely to 
“stir up hatred, serious contempt, or severe ridicule against a person or a 
group” on the grounds of race, colour, or national or ethnic origin.71  The bill 
was introduced just before the summer recess in Parliament, during which 
the then Labor government sought public submissions.72  Concerns were 
raised that: (a) the creation of a federal offense of racial incitement would 
excessively restrict freedom of speech; (b) pre-existing offenses, such as 
assault, deal with the conduct covered in the proposed amendments; and (c) 
more effective enforcement of existing laws would accomplish the same 
purpose.73  At the date this bill was introduced, there had been no 
prosecutions under parallel state legislation in New South Wales (NSW).74  
The government called an early federal election at the beginning of 1993 and 
the bill subsequently lapsed.75 Reservations expressed in the public 
submissions were allegedly taken into account by the government in an 
amended bill introduced in 1994.76   
The Racial Hatred Bill 1994 did not follow the recommendations of any 
of the national reports.  It proposed three criminal offenses, two of which 
deal with threatening to cause physical harm to persons or property because 
of race, colour or national or ethnic origin.77 Conduct reasonably likely to 
incite racial hatred was made a third criminal offense.78  Arguably, these 
proposed criminal offenses partially implemented Australia’s obligations 
under the ICCPR and the ICERD. 
The 1994 bill also proposed amending the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 to provide that it is unlawful to do an act which is “reasonably likely to 
offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” another person or group, if one of the 
reasons for doing the act is their race, color or national or ethnic origin.”79  
These civil provisions arguably have no explicit foundation in the ICCPR or 
                                                                                                                   
 71 RDA 1992, supra note 69, at 4. 
 72 McNamara & Solomon, supra note 63, at 263–64. 
 73 RDA 1992, supra note 69, at 3. 
 74 Id. at 2.  Indeed, as outlined later in this Article, there have been no prosecutions to date 
under the NSW Act.  See infra Part II.D.  
 75 McNamara & Solomon, supra note 63, at 263–64. 
 76 Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth) [hereinafter RHB 1994], available at http://parlinfo.aph. 
gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbillsdgs%2FM7
Z10%22.  Five hundred and sixty-three submissions were opposed to the proposed law, and 
eighty-three were in favor of it.  Id. at 5. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 9. 
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the ICERD since there is nothing in either treaty imposing an obligation to 
proscribe racially offensive, insulting, or humiliating speech.80  
Debate in the House of Representatives on the Racial Hatred Bill 1994 
was highly charged.  Proponents of the law noted the roots and pervasiveness 
of racism in Australia, the level of racial violence, and the devastating socio-
economic and psychological consequences of racist hate speech on its 
targets.81  They also discussed the adverse impact societal racism has on its 
targets’ inclination to engage in meaningful dialogue and participate in 
democratic institutions.82  In contrast, representatives opposed to the bill 
repeated popular claims made by journalists regarding the need to safeguard 
free speech principles from being eroded by “ ‘thought police’ and the forces 
of ‘political correctness.’ ”83  Such opponents preferred the U.S. approach to 
hate speech; namely, that the best way to counter hate speech is through 
more speech rather than the suppression of such speech.84 
The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Inquiry into 
the Racial Hatred Bill received twenty-four submissions.85  The proposed bill 
was intended to: (a) serve an educational function concerning appropriate 
standards for public discourse; and (b) punish acts threatening violence and 
inciting racial hatred so as to deter others from doing the same.86  Concerns 
were raised that pre-existing offenses already dealt with threats to people or 
property irrespective of motivation.87  The proposed offenses would be more 
difficult to prove because of the need to establish racial motive.88  This, in 
turn, could result in the acquittal of an individual who would in other 
circumstances be convicted under existing state or territory laws.89  These 
concerns were dismissed by the senate committee because prosecutors would 
                                                                                                                   
 80 See Toben v. Jones (2003) 129 FCR 515, for an example of an unsuccessful attempt  to 
challenge these civil provisions—which were ultimately incorporated into section 18C of the 
RDA—on the basis of an invalid exercise of commonwealth power with respect to “external 
affairs” due to the nonconformance of such provision with the ICERD.  See also infra note 
115 and accompanying text. 
 81 McNamara & Solomon, supra note 63, at 272. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 272–73. 
 84 Id. at 273. 
 85 SENATE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION COMMITTEE, RACIAL HATRED BILL 
1994, at 2 (1995), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/S 
enate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/pre1996/racial_hatred/index. 
 86 Id. at 2–3. 
 87 Id. at 10. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id.  
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not be prevented from charging offenders under existing state or territory 
laws.90 
An additional problem identified with the proposed criminal offenses is 
that punishment under existing laws for threats to people or property carries 
much heavier prison sentences.91  This is a significant issue that has also 
been identified in similar state laws criminalizing serious racial vilification, 
and has been a considerable factor accounting for lack of prosecutions in all 
states and territories that have made serious racial vilification a criminal 
offense.92  
The civil provisions were the only provisions with enough support in the 
Senate to be enacted into legislation.93  Responding to the Australian 
government’s failure to enact any criminal offenses, in 1994 the ICERD 
Committee recommended that Australia enact suitable laws so as to enable it 
to withdraw its reservation to Article 4(a) of the ICERD.94  In 2013, the 
                                                                                                                   
 90 Id. at 12.  Proposed section 61 of the bill provided that the criminal offenses in 
sections 58 and 59 were not intended to exclude or limit the concurrent operation of any law 
of a state or territory.  This would ensure state and territory laws are not deemed invalid under 
section 109 of the Australian Constitution due to inconsistency with commonwealth law.  
 91 Id. at 13. 
 92 Alan Berman & John Anderson, Anti-Semitic Attack Proves Need for Racial Vilification 
Laws, ON LINE OPINION (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article= 
16591.  Concern over the lack of prosecutions for serious racial vilification prompted the 
Premier of NSW to request that the Upper House Parliamentary Committee conduct an 
inquiry into the effectiveness of the state racial vilification laws.  STANDING COMM. ON LAW & 
JUSTICE, RACIAL VILIFICATION LAW IN NEW SOUTH WALES (2013) [hereinafter Committee 
Report], available at http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/Parlment/committee.nsf/0/e08d 
4387100a3c56ca257c35007fcc4d/$FILE/Racial%20vilification%20law%20in%20New%20So
uth%20Wales%20-%20Final%20report.pdf.  Some of the participants in the inquiry asserted 
that existing laws governing serious racial vilification require a much higher level of 
evidentiary proof and provide lower sentences than the parallel crimes of assault and affray in 
the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (Crimes Act).  Id. at 30–31.  For this reason, the general offences 
under the Crimes Act are invariably pursued by prosecutors.  Id.  The Committee noted the 
majority of stakeholders construed the lack of prosecutions under the existing racial 
vilification laws as indicative of their ineffectiveness, especially in light of the fact that such 
laws were intended to set a symbolic standard demonstrating that the community considers 
serious racial vilification inexcusable. Id. at 35.  As a result, the Committee concluded the 
educative and symbolic functions of the law are impeded by the absence of prosecutions as 
there has been no media coverage that would inform the wider community of their existence 
and purpose.  Id.  
 93 McNamara & Solomon, supra note 63, at 265. 
 94 Id. at 261. 
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ICERD Committee reiterated its recommendation that states parties 
withdraw existing reservations to the treaty.95  
D.  The Current “Racial Hatred” Legislative Landscape  
There are currently no separate federal criminal offenses in existence that 
implement the obligations of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR or Article 4 of the 
ICERD.96  In 2007, Australia indicated in its Fifth Report to the UNHRC 
under the ICCPR that it considered its reservation to Article 20 of the ICCPR 
necessary.97  In its concluding observations, the UNHRC called upon 
Australia to enact a comprehensive legislative framework giving effect to the 
provisions of the ICCPR at the federal level, and expressed regret with 
Australia’s continuing failure to withdraw its ongoing reservation.98  These 
observations may suggest that it is partly the lack of criminal offenses in 
existing domestic legislation that keeps Australia from complying with its 
Article 20 obligations.99 
Australia’s ongoing reservations to both treaties are primarily based on an 
exaggerated concern with maintaining notions of free speech.100  Undue 
emphasis on protecting free speech rights has eclipsed consideration of other 
human rights protections—such as the right to dignity and equality—which 
translate into the need for racial minorities to live in the community free of 
fear from hostility and violence.101  Indeed, the recent national debate 
surrounding proposed amendments to the civil liability provisions of section 
                                                                                                                   
 95 The Committee encouraged state parties retaining a reservation to explain why such a 
reservation is deemed essential, the specific impact of the reservation on existing domestic 
law and policy, as well as any strategies to reduce the scope of and withdraw the reservation 
within a set period of time.  General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 20, at 7.  
 96 Gelber Background Paper, supra note 37, at 2. 
 97 Id. at 3.  Australia also indicated its continuing reservation to Article 4(a) of ICERD is 
necessary. 
 98 Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Australia, 
95th Sess., Mar. 16–Apr. 3, 2009, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 (May 7, 2009), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/co/CCPR-C-AUS-CO5-CRP1.doc. 
 99 Gelber Background Paper, supra note 37, at 3. 
 100 McNamara & Solomon, supra note 63, at 272–73.  See also Waldron, supra note 16, at 
1599–1600 (persuasively reasoning that laws prohibiting hate speech, at a minimum, strive to 
reassure all members of society that they will be protected from “abuse, defamation, 
humiliation, discrimination and violence”). 
 101 Waldron, supra note 16, at 1599–60.  See also MCNAMARA, supra note 63, at 304–05; 
NEIL REES, SIMON RICE & DOMINIQUE ALLEN, AUSTRALIAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 620 
(2014). 
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18C of the RDA brought to light the relatively greater concern of Australians 
with respect to freedom from racial abuse in public spaces, as opposed to 
freedom of speech.102  In sharp contrast to an almost 60% increase in 
complaints of racial discrimination received in 2012, the Australian Human 
Rights Commission (AHRC) receives just a small number of complaints 
each year alleging a violation of the right to freedom of speech.103  While 
some states and territories have established criminal offenses for serious 
racial vilification, these laws do not implement all obligations flowing from 
the ICERD.104  For example, most restrict serious vilification offenses to 
public acts rather than extending the scope of the offense to all 
circumstances, irrespective of whether the vilification occurred in public as 
provided in Article 4(a) of the ICERD.105  
Moreover, the laws proscribing serious vilification have almost never 
been enforced at the state or territory level because of complicated 
procedural hurdles in the relevant legislation, a lack of knowledge on the part 
of law enforcement about the existence of such offenses, and resistance by 
prosecutors to bring claims under offenses which impose much higher 
evidentiary burdens and lighter sentences than exist for parallel common 
crimes, such as assault, affray and intimidation.106  Indeed, the only 
jurisdiction in which there has been a successful prosecution under state or 
territory legislation is Western Australia.107  The ineffectiveness of these 
                                                                                                                   
 102 See Professor Gillian Triggs, President, Sydney Institute, Address: Freedom of Speech 
and Racial Vilification: One Man’s Freedom Ends Where Another’s Start (Nov. 23, 2013) 
(transcript available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/freedom-speech-and-
racial-vilification-one-man-s-freedom-ends-where-another-s-starts). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id.  The public act requirement in the NSW legislation prompted the NSW Aboriginal 
Land Council and the NSW Young Lawyers to recommend to a parliamentary inquiry that 
NSW dispense with the requirement that the vilification be in public, noting that Article 4(a) 
of the ICERD requires the criminalization of all vilification.  Some inquiry participants 
recommended as a compromise that the public act requirement be replaced with public 
communication.  Alternatively, some suggested the internet be included in the definition of 
public act so as to capture communication on social media.  See Committee Report, supra note 
92, at 38–40; Mason, supra note 10, at 328–29.   
 106 See Mason, supra note 10, at 328–29; infra notes 201–12 and accompanying text. 
 107 Western Australia has established criminal offenses for racist conduct, including conduct 
intended to incite racial animosity or racial harassment.  See Criminal Code §§ 77–78, 80A 
(W. Austrl.).  There have been three prosecutions for these racial hatred offenses, of which, 
two have been successful.  See REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 683, 686.  Most 
recently, in 2011, a man in Western Australia was sentenced to three years imprisonment on 
six racial hatred charges for posting an online video referring to a Jewish man he encountered 
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state and territory laws in discharging Australia’s obligations under the 
ICERD and achieving the goals of hate speech regulation are canvassed in 
greater detail later in this Article.   
Australia’s overstated concern with freedom of speech contradicts the 
view of the ICERD Committee that proscribing racist hate speech 
complements rather than diminishes the right to freedom of expression.108  
Moreover, Australia’s continuing reservation to the relevant provisions in the 
ICCPR and the ICERD represents a marked difference from most other 
countries ratifying these international conventions.  Only a minority of states 
have articulated reservations to the hate speech provisions of the ICCPR and 
the ICERD.109  This signifies the principles enunciated in both treaties have 
gained relatively widespread acceptance globally.110 
E.  The Constitutional Position  
Unlike many other Western democracies, the Australian Constitution 
provides no express guarantee of freedom of expression that would impose a 
limitation on enacting federal criminal provisions in conformity with the 
relevant provisions of the ICCPR and the ICERD.  The High Court of 
Australia, however, has recognized the plenary power of the federal 
                                                                                                                   
in a supermarket as a “racist, homicidal maniac.”  In the video, the defendant said: “You have 
a religion of racism, hate, homicide and ethnic cleansing.”  Angie Raphael, Man Jailed for 
Posting Anti-Semitic Video Online, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www. 
smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/man-jailed-for-posting-antisemitic-video-online-20 
110131-1abm3.html.   
 108 See General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 20, ¶ 45. 
 109 The U.K., Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, New 
Zealand, and the U.S. have also attached reservations to Article 20 of the ICCPR.  See U.N. 
Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, https://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?sre=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en.  Austria, Belgium, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Thailand, and the U.S. have attached reservations or 
announced they would interpret Article 4 of the ICERD either in conformance with their 
constitution or consistent with the right of free expression.  See U.N. Treaty Collection, 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, http://treatie 
s.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=I V-2&chapter=4&lang=en. 
 110 Erik Bleich, The Rise of Hate Speech and Hate Crime Laws in Liberal Democracies, 37 
J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 917, 921 (2011).  The ICERD Committee has repeatedly 
called on states attaching reservations such as Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. to adopt 
legislation that would bring them in compliance with their Article 4 international legal 
obligations.  Ivan Hare, Extreme Speech under International and Regional Human Rights 
Standards, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 70 n.41, 72 n.46 (Ivan Hare & James 
Weinstein eds., 2009); SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN 
CONTROVERSY 89–90 (1994). 
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government to enact domestic legislation implementing Australia’s 
international treaty obligations.111  This broad power has three qualifications.  
First, the treaty must be bona fide.112  Second, the domestic law must 
conform to the provisions of the treaty.113  Finally, the implementing 
legislation must not violate a constitutional prohibition or limitation on 
power.114  As discussed below, the implied limit on legislative power to 
interfere with communication on governmental and political matters is 
unlikely to be a constitutional impediment to the enactment of federal laws 
criminalizing racist hate speech.115  Consequently, it is unlikely the High 
                                                                                                                   
 111 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 (holding the external affairs power 
granted under section 51 of the Australian Constitution provides the federal government with 
the power to implement treaty provisions in domestic legislation). 
 112 Id. at 216. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Tasmanian Dams Case).  In the 
Tasmanian Dams Case, the High Court held the conformance requirement means the law must 
carry 
into effect or to comply with the particular provisions of a treaty . . . [In other 
words], the law [must be] capable of being reasonably considered to be 
appropriate and adapted to achieving what is said to impress it with the 
character of a law with respect to external affairs.  [There should] be a 
reasonable proportionality between the designated purpose or object and the 
means which the law embodies for achieving or procuring it. 
Id. at 259–60.  As with constitutional jurisprudence in the U.S., the High Court is especially 
concerned with laws that are overinclusive.  Underinclusiveness is less of a concern unless the 
deficiency in implementation of a treaty “is so substantial as to deny the law the character of a 
measure implementing the convention or, when coupled with other provisions of the 
law . . . ma[ke] it substantially inconsistent with the convention.”  Victoria v Commonwealth 
(1996) 187 CLR 416.  
 115 The civil provisions of the RDA are arguably more susceptible to constitutional 
challenge as exceeding the external affairs power in the Australian Constitution because they 
do not contain criminal provisions as provided in Article 4 of the ICERD and render unlawful 
actions that are merely likely to “offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” a person or group 
because of their race or ethnic origin.  Toben v Jones (2003) 129 FCR 515.  This possibly sets 
a lower bar for legal intervention than the ICERD or ICCPR allow.  Nonetheless, in Toben, an 
Australian federal court rejected just such a challenge.  Id.  The court held the civil provisions 
need to be considered in relation to both the ICERD as well as the ICCPR, and that the 
relevant provisions prohibiting public acts are likely to incite other persons to racial hatred 
and discrimination or amount to acts of such hatred or discrimination.  Consequently, the 
ICCPR was found to be directed not just at acts of racial discrimination and hatred, but also to 
dissuading “public expressions of offensive racial prejudice that might lead to acts of racial 
hatred and discrimination.”  Id.  The court also held the legislature can choose the means by 
which it gives effect to a treaty.  Given the result in Toben, criminal provisions with language 
paralleling that contained in Article 20 of the ICCPR and Article 4 of the ICERD would likely 
be upheld against challenge as exceeding the “external affairs” power of the Commonwealth.  
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Court would strike down criminal laws implementing Australia’s obligations 
under the ICCPR and the ICERD as an invalid exercise of commonwealth 
power with respect to “external affairs.” 
Australia has neither an entrenched nor an ordinary bill of rights at the 
commonwealth level,116 however, the High Court of Australia has found that 
the doctrine of representative and responsible government reflected in the 
text and structure of the Australian Constitution implicitly guarantees the 
freedom of expression in relation to public and political matters.117  Though 
there would arguably be a limited class of racist hate speech associated with 
the freedom of political discussion, the High Court has tended to embrace an 
expansive view of public and political matters that are encompassed within 
the freedom.118 
                                                                                                                   
See also REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 618; Katharine Gelber, Implementing Racial 
Anti-Vilification Laws in New South Wales 1989–1998: A Study, 59 AUSTRALIAN J. PUBLIC 
ADMIN. 13, 21 (2000). 
 116 See GEORGE WILLIAMS & DAVID HUME, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTION 67–70 (2d ed. 2013).  In deciding not to incorporate an entrenched bill of rights 
within the Australian Constitution, the framers were heavily swayed by the writings of two 
nineteenth-century English constitutional commentators, James Bryce and A.V. Dicey, both of 
whom were cynical about the need to protect civil liberties through an entrenched bill of 
rights.  Id. at 67.  Early attempts to include provisions, such as a due process clause, were 
rejected by the framers, who were apprehensive that such a clause would inhibit the ability of 
the states to continue their racially discriminatory policies.  The debate over this clause—
which was defeated by a vote of 23 to 19—reflected the lack of concern the majority of the 
framers possessed with respect to the protection of minority rights.  Id. at 69–70.  
 117 The implied freedom of political communication is not an individual right.  See Lange v 
Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520 (stating sections 7 and 24 of the Australian 
Constitution give rise to an implied freedom of political communication that does not bestow 
individual rights).  Rather, the implied freedom acts as a restraint on legislative action, and is 
balanced against other legitimate interests.  See WILLIAMS, BRENNAN & LYNCH, supra note 
116, at 1136; Michael Coper, The High Court and Free Speech: Visions of Democracy or 
Delusions of Grandeur?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 185 (1994) (sketching the policy arguments in 
favor of, and opposing, the implied guarantee of freedom of communication in relation to 
political matters). 
 118 See Dan Meagher, What is ‘Political Communication?’ The Rationale and Scope of the 
Implied Freedom of Political Communication, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 438, 463 (2004) (noting 
the court’s terminology in Lange “necessarily entails a broader conception of political 
communication” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Racist hate speech relating to 
Australia’s immigration and asylum seeker policy would likely be associated with public and 
political discussion as it could affect federal voting intentions  See Lange, 189 CLR at 560 
(considering a particular communication to be based on “political matters” if there is a link 
with the choice of voters in federal elections or on referenda to amend the constitution under 
section 128); Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 623 (finding insulting, offensive, 
passionate, or angry speech that draws on fear or prejudice can still be classified as political if 
it can be associated with the choice of voters in federal elections).  However, outright 
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Nonetheless, the right of political communication is not absolute.  Laws 
infringing on political communication are constitutional if: (a) their purpose 
is compatible with maintaining the constitutionally prescribed system of 
representative government; and (b) they are reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to achieving a legitimate end.119  Moreover, the High Court has 
recognized governmental regulation of expression might be needed in certain 
circumstances—e.g., to prevent intimidation and undue influence in 
elections.120  Thus, even if a law burdens political communication, it might 
still survive constitutional scrutiny if the government is trying to achieve 
another legitimate goal, such as the protection of individuals from racial 
vilification, the promotion of equal opportunity for all citizens, or the 
enhancement of participation in the political process through a citizenry 
                                                                                                                   
denigration of a particular race or ethnic group arguably would not fall within the zone of 
public or political discussion.  See, e.g., Owens v Menzies (2012) QCA 170 (upholding a state 
vilification law against a challenge that it violated the implied freedom of political 
communication after concluding the relevant provision was reasonably adapted to achieve the 
legitimate aims of promoting equality of opportunity and improving the quality of democratic 
life through an educated citizenry respectful of the dignity and worth of all members). 
 119 See Coleman v Power (2004) 209 ALR 182 (holding a law must have a sufficiently 
important purpose to justify interfering with the political communication needed to maintain a 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative government).  The interest in political 
communication will in many cases trump the countervailing justification for the law.  See, 
e.g., Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 143 (indicating 
content-based restrictions will be held to a much higher level of scrutiny and must be justified 
by a reasonably tailored and compelling public interest, as opposed to content-neutral 
restrictions, which are much more likely to survive constitutional muster).  Racial vilification 
laws have been criticized as content-based restrictions designed to suppress racist ideas.  In 
actuality, anti-vilification laws are concerned with conduct that incites racial hatred, and at 
most, only incidentally prevent political communication.  See Asaf Fisher, Regulating Hate 
Speech, U. TECH. SYDNEY L. REV. 21, 42–43 (2006)  (reasoning the current RDA is directed 
at the effects of racial vilification rather than the content of the underlying racist messages 
communicated).  Even assuming the High Court considers anti-vilification laws content-
based, the interest of the government in preventing the potential physical violence often 
associated with hate speech might be sufficiently compelling to overcome the overriding 
weight usually accorded to political communication.  See Adrienne Stone & Simon Evans, 
Australia: Freedom of Speech and Insult in the High Court of Australia, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
677, 683 (2006).  Moreover, racial vilification laws arguably facilitate representative 
democracy because the targets of racist hate speech will be more likely to participate in the 
political process.  See Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, Freedom of Speech and Racial 
Vilification in Australia: ‘The Bolt Case’ in Public Discourse, 48 AUSTRALIAN J. POL. SCI. 
470, 479 (2013).  Thus, these restrictions seem compatible with maintaining the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative government.   
 120 Australian Capital Television, 177 CLR, at 142–43. 
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considerate of the worthy contribution of all its members to public 
discourse.121 
The High Court has not yet had occasion to determine if racial vilification 
laws are invalid because they burden the implied freedom of political 
communication.  State vilification laws in New South Wales, Queensland 
and Victoria have been challenged on the basis they violate the implied 
freedom of political communication, and there has been some disagreement 
about whether these laws effectively burden freedom of political 
communication.122  However, even if such laws do effectively burden 
political communication, they are nonetheless reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to achieving other legitimate ends—e.g. preventing vilification, 
promoting the human rights goals of equality and dignity as well as 
enhancing democratic life—in a manner compatible with the maintenance of 
the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible 
government.123  Thus, criminal offense provisions in commonwealth 
legislation implementing Australia’s obligations under Article 20 of the 
ICCPR and Article 4 of the ICERD are unlikely to run afoul of constitutional 
limitations. 
                                                                                                                   
 121 See, e.g., Owens v Menzies (2012) QCA 170.  In Owens, President of the Queensland 
Court of Appeal Margaret McMurdo found the challenged anti-vilification law reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to serve the legitimate ends of “promoting equality of opportunity for 
all members of the community . . . and improv[ing] the quality of democratic life through an 
educated citizenry respectful of the dignity and worth of all members.”  Id. at 415. 
 122 Compare Sunol v Collier (No. 2) (2012) NSWCA 44 (upholding the challenged 
homosexual vilification provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) as reasonably 
tailored to achieve an appropriate balance between preventing homosexual vilification and the 
freedom to discuss and debate political matters required by the constitution), with Owens v. 
Menzies (2012) QCA 170 (concluding the state vilification law was reasonably adapted to 
achieve the legitimate aim of promoting equality of opportunity and improving the quality of 
democratic life through an educated citizenry respectful of the dignity and worth of all 
members), and Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc. 15 VR 207 
(2006) (concluding the prevention of religious vilification sufficient to deny a challenge to a 
state religious vilification law on grounds that it violated the implied freedom to free political 
communication).  See also Joshua Close, Case Note, Applying an Unequal Balance: Freedom 
of Expression and Religious Vilification in Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. & Ors. v Islamic 
Council of Victoria Inc., 3 QUEENSLAND L. STUDENT REV. 1 (2010). 
 123 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.  
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F.  Implementation of International Treaty Obligations by Other Western 
Democracies 
The failure of the Australian federal government to pass criminal laws 
implementing its obligations under both the ICCPR and the ICERD is out of 
sync with most other Western democracies, which have made promotion of 
racial hatred or incitement to racial discrimination, hatred, or violence a 
criminal offense.  These countries recognize that the propagation of racist 
ideas erodes notions of equality and can ultimately lead to racial violence, 
thereby undermining social stability and public order. 
For example, the atrocities committed by the Nazis against the Jews in 
World War II affected the means deployed by European countries to deal 
with racist hate speech.124  As a result, France, Italy, Austria, and Germany 
outlawed denial of the Holocaust and particular groups holding extremist 
views.125  Similarly, Ireland, Sweden, the U.K., and the Netherlands 
criminalized incitement to racial discrimination or hatred.126  Some countries 
also sought to ban the dissemination of racist ideas inciting racial 
discrimination or hatred; recognizing such ideas are a breeding ground for 
racial intolerance and may ultimately lead to violence involving racial 
animus.127 
Other Western democracies, such as Canada (which has a constitutionally 
entrenched right of free speech), have enacted specific criminal offenses for 
public incitement of racial hatred likely to cause a breach of the peace and 
willful promotion of racial hatred.128  Indeed, there has been a growing 
                                                                                                                   
 124 Mary Coussey, Tackling Racial Equality: International Comparisons, HOME OFFICE 
RESEARCH STUDIES 10, 17–22 (2002); Robert Kahn, Why Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech? A 
Debate Between Karl Loewenstein and Robert Post, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 563 (2013); 
David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 448–49 (1987); 
Cristiana Carletti, Contemporary Social Fuelling the Genocide Intent: Hate Speech and Hate 
Crimes: Legal Remarks For a Common Definition and Related Operational Preventing 
Mechanisms, 3 EUR. CRIM. L.R. 355 (2013), available at http://www.academia.edu/6874485/ 
Contemporary_social_fuelling_the_genocide_intent_hate_speech_and_hate_crimes._Legal_re
marks_for_a_common_definition_and_related_operational_preventing_mechanisms.   
 125 See Couseey, supra note 124, at 17–22. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id.; Carletti, supra note 124, at 356. 
 128 Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. C-46, § 319 (1985) (Can.), available at http://laws-lois.justice. 
gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/page-71.html#h-92; Gelber, supra note 14, at 113; Waldron, supra note 
16, at 1596–97.  See also supra notes 30, 42; infra note 162. 
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acceptance of hate speech regulation globally.129  Even the U.S., which has 
historically extended constitutional protection to hate speech, has fashioned 
hate crime laws enhancing penalties for certain categories of crimes 
motivated by racial prejudice that have survived constitutional review.130  In 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,131 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as 
                                                                                                                   
 129 The growing acceptance of hate speech regulation globally is reflected in the 1996 South 
African Constitution that includes a hate speech provision in its constitutionally entrenched 
right to freedom of expression.  Article 16(2) of the South African Constitution provides that 
freedom of expression does not extend to incitement of imminent violence or advocacy of 
hatred based on race which constitutes incitement to cause harm.  There is also a general 
limitation clause in Article 36 allowing for the abridgement of rights to  
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and taking 
into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right; the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the 
limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, Art. 16 § 2; Art. 36, available at http://www.gov.za/documents/constit 
ution/chapter-2-bill-rights; see also Gelber, supra note 14, at 113–15. 
 130 See Eric Barendt, Free Speech in Australia: A Comparative Perspective Symposium, 
Constitutional Rights for Australia, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 149 (1994).  The traditional protection 
afforded to hate speech in the United States reflects an underlying mistrust of the government 
to remain neutral in regulating speech.  Content-based governmental restrictions of hate 
speech might ultimately lead to restrictions on other types of harmless protected speech, such 
as political speech.  The difference in approach to hate speech regulation in the United States 
and Europe can be explained in part by the unique features of U.S. history, including the fight 
for independence against a distant imperial monarch which fostered suspicion of government.  
Unlike Europe, the United States was not affected by authoritarian regimes at the time free 
speech jurisprudence was developing in the early twentieth century in the United States.  Id. at 
155–57.  In addition, constitutional provisions in some European countries, such as Germany, 
were written in the aftermath of the atrocities committed during World War II.  Consequently, 
their constitutional free speech provisions are more firmly rooted in the emerging norms of 
international human rights law reflected in the UDHR.  Manifesting their experiences during 
World War II, some European countries, including the U.K., France, and Germany all 
criminally proscribe incitement to racial hatred.  Id. at 157–60. 
 131 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged certain 
categories of speech are unprotected under the First Amendment, such as fighting words, 
obscenity, defamation, and threats of physical harm.  But even these categories of unprotected 
speech can only be regulated to the extent there is no content discrimination.  For example, the 
government may proscribe libel, but it may not proscribe only libel critical of the government.  
Thus, the First Amendment prevents the government from proscribing speech because of its 
disapproval of the ideas expressed.  Id. at 384.  The Court did note, however, that if the entire 
“basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of 
speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination 
exists.”  Id. at 388.  So, for example, the government could criminalize threats directed against 
the President since the reason threats of violence are unprotected (e.g., protecting individuals 
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unconstitutional a city hate crime ordinance prohibiting the display of a 
symbol that “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion or gender.”  The Court held the ordinance was 
content and viewpoint based, as it only proscribed a class of fighting words 
considered particularly offensive by the city; namely, fighting words that 
communicate messages of racial, gender or religious intolerance rather than 
fighting words on other topics (such as union membership) or all fighting 
words.132  Despite its decision in R.A.V., just one year later, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld a penalty enhancement scheme in a state hate crime 
statute.133  Most states in the United States now have hate crime laws.134  In 
addition, the federal government has also passed hate crime legislation 
providing for enhanced penalties for certain categories of bias inspired 
crimes.135   
                                                                                                                   
from the fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders) have special significance 
when applied to the President.  Id. 
 132 Id. at 383–84. 
 133 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).  In Mitchell, the respondent’s sentence for 
aggravated battery was enhanced pursuant to Wisconsin law on the basis he intentionally 
selected his victim on account of the victim’s race.  Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist upheld the state law, finding it directed at conduct unprotected by the First 
Amendment.  Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that bias inspired crimes are singled out for 
penalty enhancement because they are considered to cause greater individual and societal 
harm—such crimes cause distinct emotional distress on their victims, provoke community 
turmoil and are more likely to trigger retaliatory crimes.  Id. at 487–88.  In addition, judges 
have historically taken into account many factors in sentencing, including the motive for 
commission of the crime.  Id. at 485–87.  One commentator has suggested the Court’s 
reasoning that the statute punished the conduct rather than offender’s expression is a 
“distinction without a difference,” since the contested issue was not the conduct amounting to 
battery but instead the racial animus that provoked the offender.  Bleich, supra note 110, at 
924.   
 134 Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have laws creating criminal offenses for a 
number of bias inspired actions involving violence or intimidation.  See Bleich, supra note 
110, at 924. 
 135 Id.  Pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission implemented sentencing guidelines for federal hate crimes committed 
on the basis of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, or gender 
of any victim of such crimes.  28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).  In 2009, federal hate crime laws were 
extended to crimes motivated by animus to the victim’s actual or perceived gender, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or disability.  Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4701, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 249 (2012)) (this bill also eliminated the requirement that a victim of intimidation or 
violence be engaged in one of the areas of protected activity previously designated in the Civil 
Rights Act such as attending schools, applying for employment, and voting).  This measure 
was added to a Defense Spending Bill to ensure it was not blocked by Republicans.  See Jeff 
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More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has displayed a greater 
willingness to allow regulations proscribing symbolic hate speech under the 
“true threats” exception to First Amendment protection.  In Virginia v. Black, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of a state law making it a felony to 
burn a cross on another’s property with the intent to intimidate any person or 
group.136  Under the law, cross burning was considered “prima facie 
evidence of an intent to intimidate.”137  The Court held the provision 
unconstitutional because it discriminated on the basis of content and 
viewpoint by selectively singling out cross burning due to its distinctive 
message.138  At the same time, the Court held that cross burning could be 
criminally proscribed as a “true threat” if it was used to intimidate another 
person.139  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, concluded “the First 
Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent 
to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of 
intimidation,” and therefore the regulation of the unprotected category of 
speech (true threats) in this manner was content neutral.140  
In conclusion, it is apparent that the global trend concerning hate speech 
regulation may reflect a growing interaction between domestic hate speech 
law and the developing body of international human rights law concerning 
the permissible parameters and requisite standards for hate speech regulation 
contained in the ICCPR and the ICERD.  This interaction may also be 
observed with regard to the national laws of many other countries that 
provide greater domestic regulation of hate speech in fulfilment of their 
obligations under the two treaties.141    
                                                                                                                   
Zeleny, Obama Signs Hate Crimes Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2009), available at http:// 
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/obama-signs-hate-crimes-bill/?_r=0. 
 136 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).  
 137 Id. at 343 (emphasis added). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 360. 
 140 Id. at 362.  
 141 Some international scholars, such as former Australian High Court Justice Michael 
Kirby, have convincingly reasoned that the forces of globalization have led to greater mutual 
dependence of states.  See Justice Michael Kirby, Address at University of Adelaide and 
Flinders University Conference on International Law: Hope Amidst the Gloom (Feb.  27, 
2004) (transcript available at http://www.hsourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/kirbyj/kirbyj_27feb04.html).  Such dependence has played an influential role in 
fostering greater harmony in human rights protections globally.  Justice Kirby pointed to the 
emergence of a “transnational jurisprudence” in most ultimate courts throughout the globe as 
one aspect of globalization.  Id.  This has been exhibited in the greater recourse to 
international human rights law in the process of constitutional interpretation.  See Berman, 
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III.  FREE SPEECH JUSTIFICATIONS AND RACIST HATE SPEECH 
Free speech adherents generally proclaim three main justifications for 
protecting speech.  First, proponents contend testing ideas in an unregulated 
marketplace will ultimately lead to the discovery of truth.142  Second, free 
expression fosters democratic values.143  Third, individuals must be free to 
express themselves to promote self-actualization.144 
According to the first justification, truth will percolate to the surface 
through a free flow of dialogue in the competitive marketplace of ideas.  
Based on the writings of John Stuart Mill, this justification for free speech 
was initially judicially recognized by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States:  
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe 
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.  It is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment.  Every year if not every 
day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based 
upon imperfect knowledge.  While that experiment is part of 
our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against 
                                                                                                                   
supra note 14, at n.9; Halpin, supra note 60, at 492–96 (asserting the forces of globalization, 
international human rights norms, foreign policy considerations, academic commentary, and 
the internet have had some influence in sustaining prohibitions of particular hate speech in the 
U.S., particularly in the post 9-11 period as the Court has seemingly excepted from First 
Amendment protection speech intended to induce fear of some harm in the future).  The 
proliferation of racist hate speech globally has been associated with an increase in terrorism, 
which reinforces the importance of tackling the problem both domestically and 
internationally.  Mahoney, supra note 7, at 321 n.1.  See also infra note 158. 
 142 The notion that unfettered choice in the marketplace of ideas is the best way to ensure 
truth underpins U.S. Supreme Court free speech jurisprudence and reflects a mistrust of 
government.  See Barendt, supra note 130, at 156; Andrew Kenyon, What Conversation? Free 
Speech and Defamation Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 697, 698, 706 (2010) (suggesting suspicion of 
governmental action as a possible fourth justification for resisting legal restrictions on 
speech).   
 143 Gelber, supra note 14, at 109–10. 
 144  Id. 
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attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and 
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently 
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing 
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save 
the country.145   
The argument suggests that the best way to counter racist hate speech is to 
allow more speech. This, in turn, acts as a safety valve.  In other words, legal 
restrictions on hate speech will merely drive speech underground.  This 
could ultimately lead to physical violence against the targets of such speech, 
thereby proving more menacing to racial harmony.  However, there is no 
empirical evidence supporting this safety valve theory.  During the recent 
national debate on proposed changes to the civil provisions of the RDA, 
Prime Minister Abbott relied on this justification as a basis for amending the 
legislation to raise the legal threshold for bringing a civil complaint for racial 
vilification: “No one wants to see bigotry or intolerance in our society.  The 
best counter to a bad argument is a good one.  And the best antidote to 
bigotry is decency, proclaimed by people engaging in a free and fair 
debate.”146  
Some scholars question the validity of the marketplace of ideas 
conception of free speech. These scholars argue that truth is unlikely to 
emerge in an entirely unregulated market,147 particularly when participants in 
the market do not have the resources to ensure equal access to have their 
views aired.148  As such, the ability of an idea to gain acceptance in the 
marketplace may reflect the allure rather than the truth of such idea.149  
This criticism is equally applicable to racist hate speech  Racist hate 
speech has no value in discovering truth in the competition of the 
                                                                                                                   
 145 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).  See also Kenyon, supra note 142, at 
702; Gelber, supra note 14, at 109. 
 146 Judith Ireland, Politics Live, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www. 
smh.com.au/federal-politics/the-pulse-live/politics-live-march-25-2014-20140324-35ew5.html. 
 147 See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free 
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 502 (2011); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and 
Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 487 (2011).  But cf. Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the 
Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth As a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 
595 (2011) (rejecting the idea that truth is unlikely to emerge in an unregulated market and 
defending the marketplace of ideas conception of free speech). 
 148 See Marie Iskander, Balancing Freedoms and Creating a Fair Marketplace of Ideas: The 
Value of 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act, 8 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 19, 19 (2014) (citing 
Eric Barendt, Why Protect Free Speech?, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH 34 (2d ed. 2005)). 
 149 Barendt, supra note 130, at 156. 
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marketplace of ideas because the speech is based on false stereotypes.150  
Furthermore, individuals or groups subjected to hate speech are unlikely to 
engage in a robust dialogue that would demonstrate the fallacies inherent in 
the speech because hate speech has the effect of silencing its targets.  Finally, 
the marketplace of ideas rationale assumes individuals act rationally in 
embracing or rejecting particular ideas.  However, a multiplicity of factors, 
aside from reason, often determines if an individual will subscribe to racist 
ideas, and it is not entirely rational.151  Therefore, the marketplace of ideas 
rationale does not present an adequate justification for protecting hate 
speech.  
According to the second rationale, free speech fosters democratic values.  
Such values depend upon unrestricted expression on political matters so that 
citizens can participate meaningfully by making informed decisions at the 
polling booth. As discussed above, the High Court of Australia relied on this 
rationale in finding an implied constitutional freedom of political 
communication arising from the system of representative government.152  
Yet, the implied freedom is not absolute.153  Laws regulating racist hate 
speech arguably prevent potential violence that can result from such speech.  
Severe racial vilification has a chilling effect on the willingness of racial 
minorities to participate in public discourse, thereby eroding their ability to 
meaningfully participate in the political process and broader community 
activities.  Thus, such laws arguably foster democratic and community 
values rather than impede them.154  
The self-actualization rationale views expression, including the freedom 
to seek, receive, and communicate information and ideas, as vital to human 
self-development.155  This rationale assumes that self-development is an 
absolute right that should not be affected by other interests, such as respect 
                                                                                                                   
 150 See Kretzmer, supra note 128, at 476; Kenyon, supra note 142, at 697–98 (asserting hate 
speech and vilification cannot be regarded as conversational speech that facilitates truth in the 
marketplace of ideas).  Canadian Supreme Court cases considering the constitutionality of 
criminal laws banning racist hate propaganda also recognize that such speech can hinder the 
search for truth as bigotry obscures reasoning in an entirely unregulated marketplace of ideas, 
thereby obliterating the marketplace.  See, e.g., Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697. 
 151 Kretzmer, supra note 128, at 470. 
 152 Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 71–72, 74.  Some commentators 
have suggested the discovery of truth rationale has also influenced High Court reasoning in 
the implied freedom cases.  See, e.g., Gelber, supra note 14, at 110. 
 153 See Australian Capital Television, 177 CLR at 142. 
 154 Kenyon, supra note 142, at 704. 
 155 Id. at 705–06.  This rationale is reflected in Article 19(2) of the ICCPR. 
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for the dignity of all members of society.156  Hate speech, however, has been 
demonstrated to have damaging physical and psychological effects on its 
targets and the wider racial group of which they are or perceived to be a 
member.157  For this reason, regulations restricting racist hate speech actually 
promote self-development, and the chief reasons advanced in support of free 
speech do not justify protecting speech inciting racial discrimination, hatred, 
and violence. 
IV.  EXISTING LAWS DO NOT FURTHER THE POLICIES OF RACIAL HATE 
SPEECH REGULATION 
Laws regulating the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or 
hatred, advocacy of racial hatred that constitutes incitement to racial 
discrimination, hostility and violence as well as severe vilification (threats to 
persons or property based on racial animus) are intended to serve manifold 
functions.  Such laws are meant to: (a)  promote the values of representative 
democracy by seeking to ensure racial minorities participate meaningfully in 
public and political discourse; (b) redress historical marginalization and 
discrimination of racial minorities; (c) encourage civil dialogue and respect 
between all groups in society; (d) foster fundamental principles of human 
rights, such as the right to dignity and equality, which allow racial minorities 
to live in the community free from fear of hostility and violence; (e) serve an 
educative and symbolic function in highlighting societal abhorrence of hate 
speech involving racial animus; (f) further the goals of retribution, 
community protection, deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation; and (g) 
advance social cohesion by endorsing tolerance of diversity in a multicultural 
society.158  Existing state and commonwealth legislative schemes fail to 
achieve these goals in a number of ways.159  
                                                                                                                   
 156 Kritzmer, supra note 128, at 482–83. 
 157 Victims and their associated racial groups have their sense of security eroded because 
they feel susceptible to future physical and emotional injury.  See Mason, supra note 1, at 883, 
890; Warner, supra note 1, at 389.  This detrimental impact also applies to members of other 
marginalized minority groups experiencing severe vilification, such as members of the 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community.  See generally ALAN BERMAN & 
SHIRLEEN ROBINSON, SPEAKING OUT: STOPPING HOMOPHOBIC AND TRANSPHOBIC ABUSE IN 
QUEENSLAND 202 (2010). 
 158 Hate crime laws recognize the targets of such crimes, the wider group of which people are 
perceived to be a member of, and society in general, suffer greater injury than victims of crimes 
not motivated by animus or prejudice toward protected groups.  These injuries may include 
pecuniary loss as well as a variety of negative feelings, such as loss of dignity, depression, and 
other physical maladies induced by racial vilification.  There is a growing body of national and 
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A.  Commonwealth Laws 
At present, the Commonwealth cannot prosecute as separate substantive 
hate crimes individuals engaging in the most egregious forms of racist hate 
speech, such as instances involving severe vilification.  Incidents of severe 
racial vilification undermine societal attempts to promote social justice and 
the human rights principles of dignity, equality and tolerance.  Such incidents 
also increase the moral blameworthiness of the offender and should justify 
greater punishment.  Expressly labelling and penalizing such conduct as hate 
crimes reinforces the law’s symbolic and educational message about 
society’s unwillingness to countenance the commission of such acts.160  
This significant gap in the criminal law can be remedied by the creation 
of a separate offense labelled as “severe racial vilification” and is justified on 
the basis of “draw[ing] public attention to the wrongness of a particular 
                                                                                                                   
international literature documenting the links between personal experiences of racism and poor 
health.  See generally Yin Paradies, A Systematic Review of Empirical Research on Self-reported 
Racism and Health, 35 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 888 (2006); YIN PARADIES, RICCI HARRIS & IAN 
ANDERSON, THE IMPACT OF RACISM ON INDIGENOUS HEALTH IN AUSTRALIA AND AOTEAROA: 
TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA (2008) (cooperative Research Centre for Aboriginal Health, 
Discussion Paper Series No. 4), available at https://www.lowitja.org.au/sites/default/files/docs/ 
Racism-Report.pdf; MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIAN LAW: A 
DELICATE PLANT 193–95 (2002); JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 5 (2012); 
Mason, supra note 1, at 874; Gail Mason, The Hate Threshold: Emotion, Causation and 
Difference in the Construction of Prejudice-Motivated Crime, 23 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 293, 
294–98 (2014); Mason, supra note 10, at 328–29; Meagher, supra note 1, at 225; Cagle Juhan,  
Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile Speech Environment, 98 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2012). 
 159 See Mason, supra note 1, at n.10 (noting it is debatable if a commonwealth offense exists 
for urging the use of force or violence against a racial group).  In 2010, the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code was amended making it an offense to intentionally urge the use of violence 
against a group of people, or a member of a group, when the target group is distinguished by 
race.  See Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 80.2A–80.2B.  The offender must intend that 
violence or force will occur, and the use of violence or force must “threaten the peace, order 
and good government of the Commonwealth.”  Id.  This provision is actually contained in 
Division 80 of the Criminal Code entitled “Treason, urging violence and advocating 
terrorism.”  Id.  It is most unlikely this provision of the Criminal Code would cover the range 
of speech for which international law requires the creation of criminal offenses, as such 
conduct can be clearly distinguished from treason and terrorism offenses which are largely 
motivated by hostility towards the government.   
 160 See supra note 157.  As previously canvassed, excessive concern with maintaining 
notions of free speech has largely overshadowed historical debate on suggested 
commonwealth criminal offenses for inciting racial hatred and violence as well as severe 
vilification.  See generally supra notes 60–80, 94–95 and accompanying text; MCNAMARA, 
supra note 63. 
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course of action.”161  The wrongness of particular conduct is what underpins 
the case for criminalization, and in the case of “severe racial vilification,” the 
“wrongness stems from the fact that it treats those affected as less than full 
members of the community.  It is wrong because it degrades the dignity of 
the minority . . . [and] fail[s] to treat minorities with equal respect as human 
beings.”162  The underlying norms of equality and entitlement to be treated as 
full members of society provide the reason for regulating this specific kind of 
offense in light of the “bad consequences that flow from the discriminator’s 
culpable choice, that is, the objective consequence of treating certain 
members of the community as less than full members of society.”163 
The creation of a specific “severe racial vilification” offense aims to serve 
the goals of retribution, community protection, denunciation, and deterrence 
by proportionately punishing such conduct, denouncing the perpetrators of 
such conduct, and discouraging others from committing such offenses in the 
future.164  Even though it is possible these aims are advanced by establishing 
separate substantive hate crime offenses, the experience of other jurisdictions 
with federal systems of government, such as Canada, demonstrate that the 
use of criminal sanctions at the commonwealth level for racist hate speech 
offenses165 has limited utility in cultivating equality and tolerance of 
diversity in a multicultural society, as the instances of prosecution are low.166  
                                                                                                                   
 161 See ANDREW ASHWORTH & JEREMY HORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 79 (7th ed. 
2013) (providing as examples of the principle of fair labeling “the creation of racially or 
religiously aggravated versions of certain offences, where the aggravating feature becomes 
part of the offence label rather than merely a matter that affects sentencing”). 
 162 DENNIS J. BAKER, THE RIGHT NOT TO BE CRIMINALIZED: DEMARCATING CRIMINAL LAW’S 
AUTHORITY 201–02 (Tom Campbell ed., 2011). 
 163 Id. at 202. 
 164 See generally supra notes 60–80, 94–95 and accompanying text; MCNAMARA, supra note 
63.  
 165 Canada has established criminal offenses for inciting racial hatred in a public place and 
the willful promotion of racial hatred.  See Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. C-46, § 319 (1985) 
(Can.).  These criminal provisions have been upheld against constitutional challenge by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  See, e.g., Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 (holding infringements on the 
right of free speech are constitutional when narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial 
governmental interest thus satisfying the requirement of proportionality).  Aside from these 
criminal offenses, the Canadian Human Rights Act of 1977 made it unlawful to communicate 
hate messages or propaganda; however, this civil provision was repealed in 2013.  See Luke 
McNamara, Criminalising Racial Hatred: Learning from the Canadian Experience, 1 
AUSTRAL. J. HUM. RTS. 198, 201–03 (1994); Mahoney, supra note 63, at 231 nn.119–31; 
Edgar, supra note 13, at 139–45. 
 166 See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 784 (conceding the imperfections of criminal laws in 
promoting equality and tolerance of diversity in a multicultural society).  The low number of 
actual prosecutions in Canada evidences the reluctance of the state to prosecute hate 
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Moreover, even in jurisdictions with unitary systems of government, such as 
Norway, the failure to prosecute persons committing racist hate speech 
offenses has been criticized for undermining efforts to encourage respectful 
dialogue between different groups in society, promote equality, tolerance of 
diversity in a multicultural society, and the meaningful participation of racial 
minorities in public and political discourse.167  Nonetheless, at the very least, 
the criminal law can be deployed in cases requiring tough punitive measures 
against more severe racial vilification—i.e. incitement to racial hatred and 
overt violence and physical threats to persons and property based on race—
as an important symbolic gesture to emphasize societal disapproval of such 
conduct and hopefully deter prospective violators.  As Kathleen Mahoney 
has convincingly reasoned:  
The need for a state to apply hate speech laws with firmness, 
consistency, and wisdom is essential if the norms of behaviour 
we wish to promote in society are to be encouraged.  We 
cannot erase hatred from the world, but we can condemn it and 
criminalize it.  Of all the actions that can be taken to prevent 
atrocities before they happen . . . there is none more important 
than prohibiting the worst forms of hate speech.168 
The only remedies currently available at the commonwealth level in 
Australia to deal with racial vilification are civil ones contained in the RDA.  
Access to these remedies, however, entails a lengthy procedure that must be 
followed by the victim as a pre-condition to commencing civil 
                                                                                                                   
propaganda except in the most serious cases.  MCNAMARA, supra note 63, at nn.33–35 and 
accompanying text.   
 167 The failure to prosecute persons for racist hate speech offenses (including under the 2005 
amendments) has been sharply criticized in Norway.  For example, a blogger advocating 
violence against Muslims in Norway has not been prosecuted under the revised laws.  See 
supra note 48; Singre Bangstad, Comment, Whatever Happened To Norway’s Incitement 
Laws, INSTIT. OF RACE REL. (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.irr.org.uk/news/whateve 
r-happened-to-norways-incitement-laws.  In 2011, a right-wing fanatic murdered seventy-
seven people in Norway (many of whom were attending a young Labour Party conference) to 
decimate future Labour leaders and prevent the continued breakdown of Nordic culture 
brought about by the influx of Muslims.  Press Release, Institute of Race Religion, The 
Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre (Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://www.irr.org.uk/ 
news/breivik-the-conspiracy-theory-and-the-oslo-massacre/. 
 168 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 351. 
86 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:45 
 
 
proceedings.169  The victim must initially file a complaint with the AHRC.170  
After a complaint is lodged, the matter may be dismissed if the substance of 
the complaint is not covered by the RDA.171  The matter may also be 
dismissed after an investigation is conducted if it is determined the matter is 
one over which the AHRC has no jurisdiction under the legislation.172  If 
appropriate, an attempt will be made to conciliate or resolve the matter 
through a face-to-face meeting or telephone conference.173  The AHRC is not 
empowered to determine if unlawful discrimination as defined under the 
RDA has occurred.174  If the matter is not resolved by the Commission, the 
complaint is terminated and the complainant has sixty days to commence 
civil proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court or the Federal Court of 
Australia for breaches of section 18C of the RDA.175  This process depends 
solely on complaints instigated by individuals or groups affected by the 
challenged breach.  The AHRC has neither the resources nor the mandate to 
initiate investigations of breaches of the legislation in the absence of a 
complaint.   
It is unclear if conciliation is a viable way of dealing with the volume of 
complaints filed with the AHRC annually.  Conciliation might promote civil 
dialogue and respect between different racial groups in some instances, but it 
is unlikely to rectify historical marginalization and discrimination of racial 
minorities.  In addition, the conciliation process is confidential.  For this 
reason, any resolution does not further the educative and symbolic goals of 
the law in underscoring community norms repudiating racist hate speech.  
Furthermore, most complainants lack the resources and inclination to pursue 
civil remedies if the matter is not resolved.  And finally, civil litigation may 
                                                                                                                   
 169 MCNAMARA, supra note 63, at 304–05.  The procedure for instituting an action in states 
providing civil remedies for incitement of racial hatred is equally cumbersome.  See, e.g., 
Ekermawi v Jones (No. 3) (2014) NSWCATAD 58.  The procedural history of this NSW case 
was protracted, demonstrating the need to attempt conciliation before instituting a civil claim 
of racial vilification with the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal.   
 170 The Complaints Process for Complaints About Sex, Race, Disability, and Age 
Discrimination, AHRC, http://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaint-process-complaints-about-
sex-race-disability-and-age-discrimination. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
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have no impact in dissuading a persistent violator of the law seeking to gain 
notoriety to desist.176  
During the recent national debate on possible changes to the RDA, the 
Prime Minister accurately noted the threshold for bringing a civil action for 
racial vilification is relatively low under existing legislation as liability can 
attach to conduct that is “reasonably likely . . . to offend, insult, humiliate or 
intimidate” another person or group in public because of their race.177  There 
                                                                                                                   
 176 MCNAMARA, supra note 63, at 304–05; KATHARINE GELBER, SPEECH MATTERS: GETTING 
FREE SPEECH RIGHT 85 (2011). 
 177 Under existing legislation, it is unlawful to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another 
person or group in public because of their race.  Section 18C of the RDA, entitled “Offensive 
behaviour because of race, colour or national or ethnic origin” states specifically:  
(1) It is unlawful for a person to do an act otherwise than in private, if: 
 (a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, 
insult, humiliate, or intimidate another person or a group of people; and 
 (b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic 
origin of the other person or of some or all of the people in the group. 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 18C, available at http://austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/co 
nsol_act/rda1975202/s18c.html.  There are three key elements required to establish civil 
liability: 
(1) the act must be done otherwise than in private; 
(2) which is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances to offend, insult, 
humiliate or intimidate another person or group of people.  This element 
focuses on the impact of the act on the people against whom it is directed; 
(3) other person or group of people.   
A number of cases have considered the requisite showing a complainant must satisfy to 
establish each of these elements.  See Racial Vilification Law in Australia, AUSTRALIAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (2002), available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publication 
ns/racial-vilification-law-australia (providing an overview of the cases considering each of 
these elements); see also REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 628–56 (considering in 
detail all of the case law interpreting section 18C).  The key element in establishing civil 
liability under section 18C is the emotional impact of the speech on the victim of the offensive 
or insulting speech.  This section does not deal with speech that is likely to incite others to 
hate the victim due to comments based on their race as required under Article 20(2) of the 
ICCPR.   Rather, section 18C is designed to protect individuals against racial prejudice and 
intolerance.  
  There are exemptions (or defenses) to civil liability under section 18C.  These three 
exemptions are set out in section 18D which states: 
(1) Section 18C does not render unlawful anything said or done reasonably 
and in good faith: 
 (a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or 
 (b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate 
made or held for any genuine academic, artistic or, scientific purpose or any 
other genuine purpose in the public interest; or 
 (c) in making or publishing: 
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is no international human right to be free from racially offensive 
comments.178  The government’s recent unsuccessful attempt to change 
                                                                                                                   
(i) a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of public 
interest; or 
(ii) a fair comment on any event or matter of public interest if the 
comment is an expression of a genuine belief held by the person 
making the comment. 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 180.  These exemptions have also received extensive 
consideration by the federal courts.  See REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 656–69.  
  Some academic commentators have noted that section 18C sets a comparatively low bar 
for establishing liability.  See MCNAMARA, supra note 63, at 50.  A major impetus for the 
move to replace section 18C was a ruling in the landmark case Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 CFR 
261.  In Bolt, comments were made in two newspaper articles by a conservative commentator, 
Andrew Bolt, suggesting certain high profile “fair-skinned Aboriginals” (such as legal 
academic Professor Larissa Behrendt) were not genuinely Aboriginal (referred to as “political 
Aborigine”), but were pretending to be so they could access benefits available to Aboriginals, 
such as university scholarships.  These comments were held by the federal court to be in 
violation of section 18C.  None of the exemptions in section 18D were held to apply.  Id.  
Section 18D permits fair comments made in good faith, if such comments are “an expression 
of a genuine belief held by the person making the comment.”  This fair comment defense 
covers a large amount of journalistic writing, provided it is based on accurate statements of 
fact.  The court found Bolt did not make the comments in good faith as both articles contained 
factual errors, distortions of the truth and inflammatory language.  Bibhu Aggarwal, The Bolt 
Case: Silencing Speech or Promoting Tolerance?, MORE OR LESS DEMOCRACY AND NEW 
MEDIA (2012), http://www.futureleaders.com.au/book_chapters/pdf/More-or-Less/Bibhu_Ag 
garwal.pdf; Andrew Bolt, What is the New Black, HERALD SUN (Apr. 15, 2009), http://blogs. 
news.com.au/heraldsun/Andrewbolt/index.php/heraldsun/comments/column_white_is_the_ ne 
w_black#52712.  
  Some academics, including former Chief Justice of the NSW Supreme Court James 
Spigelman, have suggested Bolt marshalled in a new era in which the right not to be offended 
trumped the right of free speech.  The current Attorney General defended the right of 
journalists, such as Bolt, against political censorship saying, “[p]eople like Mr. Bolt should be 
free to express any opinion on a social or cultural or a political question that they wish to 
express.”  Emma Griffiths, George Brandis Defends ‘Right to be a Bigot’ Amid Government 
Plan to Amend Racial Discrimination Act, ABC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.abc.net. 
au/news/2014-03-24/brandis-defends-right-to-be-a-bigot/5341552.  This reasoning has been 
rejected with vehemence by other commentators who assert the case simply recognizes the 
need to balance the right of free speech alongside correspondingly valuable rights, including 
the right to be free from racial bias and intolerance.  See Aggarwal, supra note 177; Sarah 
Maddison, Indigenous Identity, ‘Authenticity’ and the Structural Violence of Settler 
Colonialism, 20 IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUDIES IN CULTURE AND POWER 288–303 (examining 
the “structural violence” experienced by Aboriginals living in urban areas, and concluding that 
Bolt represents an attempt on the part of this group of indigenous people to preserve their 
indigenous identity in the face of the symbolic violence that the challenged publications 
represent).  
 178 Sarah Joseph, Andrew Bolt, Free Speech, and Racial Intolerance, CASTAN CENTRE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Sept. 29, 2011), http://castancentre.com/2011/09/29/andrew-bolt-free-
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existing legislation179 to make it unlawful to vilify or intimidate another 
person or group based on race180 might have been more appropriate as a 
                                                                                                                   
speech-and-racial-intolerance/; Sarah Joseph, Submission on the Repeal of Section 18C of the 
Racial Discrimination Act, CASTAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 5–6 (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.law.monash.edu.au/castancentre/policywork/section-18c-submission.pdf.  See also 
Maddison, supra note 177, at 298. 
 179 AHRC President Gillian Triggs, prominent members of the legal community, academics, 
racial and ethnic minority groups, and members of Parliament (including some members of 
the governing party which suggested the changes), expressed opposition to the proposed 
changes.  On behalf of 190 ethnic communities, the Community Relations Commission of 
NSW made a submission to the federal government opposing the proposed changes to the 
legislation:  
Our laws against racial vilification are one of the few inhibitors we possess 
against the introduction into Australia of the racism which underpins many 
overseas conflicts and violence to which it can give rise . . . the changes 
proposed . . . will send a dangerous signal that hate speech is sanctioned by 
the law as a form of freedom of speech, that bigotry has a place in our 
society . . . The practical effect will be that far fewer cases of racist behaviour 
will be deemed unlawful, and many such cases will not only be excused, but 
even celebrated as a demonstration of freedom of speech.  Even in situations 
of unambiguous abuse, the victim will be required by law to prove that the 
abuse may incite a third party to racial hatred or has caused fear of physical 
harm—extremely narrow and difficult tests to satisfy. 
Media Statement, Community Relations Commission of NSW Urges Government to Back 
Down on 18C (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.crc.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/2281 
9/20140331_CRC_urges_government_to_back_down_on_18C.pdf; Patricia Karvelas, Dump 
Race Hate Reforms: Migrants, THE AUSTRALIAN (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.theaustralian. 
com.au/national-affairs/dump-race-hate-reforms-migrants/story-fn59niix-1226887050671?n 
k=55bc3a1bfc0441f91d4c1480387f912f.  A group representing “Indigenous, Greek, Jewish, 
Chinese, Arab, Armenian and Korean communities” also vigorously objected to the proposed 
changes, recognizing the RDA was enacted in 1995 after three nationwide studies found a link 
between racial vilification and violence motivated by racial animus.  Joint Statement, National 
Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Leaders Reject Proposed RDA Changes (Mar. 18, 
2014), available at http://nationalcongress.com.au/joint-statment-race-hate-laws/.  See also 
Stephanie Anderson, Liberal MP to Cross Floor on Racial Discrimination Changes, SBS 
NEWS (Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/08/05/liberal-
mp-cross-floor-racial-discrimination-act-changes.  Overwhelming community resistance 
forced the current government to forego any immediate plans to amend existing federal racial 
vilification laws.  Mark Kenny, Race Hate: Voters Tell Brandis to Back Off, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/ra 
ce-hate-voters-tell-brandis-to-back-off-20140413-zqubv.html (a nationwide poll found almost 
90% of respondents supported the existing law making it “unlawful to offend, insult or 
humiliate someone because of their race or ethnicity.”).  Emma Griffiths, Government 
Backtracks on Racial Discrimination Act 18C Changes; Pushes Ahead with Tough Security 
Laws, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-05/government-back 
tracks-on-racial-discrimination-act-changes/5650030.   
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criminal offense in partial implementation of Australia’s obligations under 
the ICERD,  provided the defenses suggested by the Attorney General are 
eliminated.181  Under the draft legislation, “vilify” means inciting hatred 
                                                                                                                   
 180 The proposed changes to this legislation were contained in an exposure draft released by 
the current Attorney General, George Brandis.  The Freedom of Speech (Repeal of 18C) Bill 
2014 exposure draft would have repealed sections 18C, 18D, and 18E and inserted the 
following:  
1. It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, if  
(a) the act is reasonably likely: 
(i)  to vilify another person or group of persons; or 
(ii) to intimidate another person or a group of persons, and 
(b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or 
ethnic origin of that person or that group of persons. 
2. For purposes of this section: 
(a) vilify means to incite hatred against a person or a group of 
persons; 
 (b) intimidate means to cause fear of physical harm: 
(1) to a person; or 
(2) to the property of a person; or  
(3) to the members of a group of persons. 
3. Whether an act is reasonably likely to have the effect specified in sub-
section (1)(a) is to be determined by the standards of an ordinary reasonable 
member of the Australian community, not by the standards of any particular 
group within the Australian community. 
4. This section does not apply to words, sounds, images or writing spoken, 
broadcast, published or otherwise communicated in the course of 
participating in the public discussion of any political, social, cultural, 
religious, artistic, academic or scientific matter. 
Media Release, Attorney-General for Australia Minister For the Arts, Racial Discrimination 
Act (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2014/First%2 
0Quarter/25March2014-RacialDiscriminationAct.aspx.   
  Triggs noted the greatest flaw in the exposure draft is that it has been motivated 
principally by a desire to ensure a “Bolt-like case [did] not emerge again. . . . [trying] to 
change the law to deal with that one case is probably, as a matter of legislative drafting and 
law reform, not a wise approach to the law.”  Tony Jones, Proposed Changes to Racial 
Discrimination Act Need to be Redrafted, ABC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.abc.net. 
au/lateline/content/2014/s3972316.htm.  See Law Institute of Victoria, Exposure Draft of the 
Freedom of Speech (Repeal of s18C) Bill 2014: Submission to the Commonwealth Attorney-
General (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.liv.asn.au/getattachment/e34b9ad3-cd16-4187-a49e-beb 
4bee35121/Exposure-Draft--Freedom-of-Speech-(Repeal-of-s18C).aspx; see also Maurice 
Blackburn Lawyers, Exposure Draft of the Freedom of Speech (Repeal of  s18C) Bill 2014 
(Cth): Submission to the Attorney-General Hon. George Brandis (Apr. 2014), http://hrlc.org. 
au/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Submission-Racial-Discrimination-Act-reforms-300414.pdf; 
Sarah Joseph, Rights to Bigotry and Green Lights to Hate, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 27, 
2014), http://theconversation.com/rights-to-bigotry-and-green-lights-to-hate-24946. 
 181 See Meagher, supra note 1, at n.102 (accurately pointing out that criminal laws reflect 
more serious conduct that is punitive in nature).  For this reason, criminal laws are unlikely to 
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against a person or group.  The exposure draft limits “intimidation” to fear of 
physical harm.182  Both are forms of conduct requiring criminalization under 
the ICERD.   
To fully discharge its obligations under the ICERD, the government 
should extend criminal liability to include the dissemination of ideas based 
on racial superiority or hatred, inciting racial hatred, contempt or 
discrimination (through the expression of insults, ridicule, slander or 
otherwise), and physical threats to persons or property based on race 
(serious/severe vilification) or incitement to such acts.183  
The following are possible formulations of four offenses in a graded 
hierarchy that would comply with the obligations under the ICERD:   
(1) Any person who knowingly or recklessly does an act 
that is reasonably likely in all the circumstances to184 
                                                                                                                   
provide defenses on free speech or public interest grounds.  Id.  In addition, proposed changes 
under section 3 of the exposure draft would have provided a defense to virtually any 
journalistic comment, academic commentary, artistic expression, or indeed any expression in 
a social or public context that incites racial hatred or intimidates an individual or racial group, 
even if such comments are not made in good faith.   Contrasted with existing legislation, 
section 4 of the exposure draft does not require a showing that the acts or comments were 
made reasonably and in good faith.  This was intended to excuse the comments made by Bolt 
in both newspaper articles.  See Gillian Triggs, Address to the National Press Club: The 
Freedom Wars and the Future of Human Rights in Australia (Apr. 9, 2014) (transcript 
available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/freedom-wars-and-future-human-
rights-australia). 
 182 The proposed changes to the civil provisions of the RDA in the exposure draft defining 
“vilify” and “intimidate” very narrowly is more appropriately addressed by the criminal law 
for more serious instances of racist hate speech.  The determination of whether an act is likely 
to vilify is judged by an ordinary reasonable member of the Australian community without 
reference to the impact of the speech on the person or group to whom it is directed.  This is 
consistent with the interpretation of incitement embraced by commentators in relation to 
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR.  See, e.g., Benesch, supra note 27 (contending incitement should 
focus on the intent or actual impact of the speech in arousing one’s audience to harm another 
individual or group through the acts of discrimination, hostility, or violence).  
 183 See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 221–22 (proposing 
eliminating the state and territory criminal offenses for serious vilification as there have been 
no prosecutions under such laws, except for Western Australia, and this would promote 
uniformity and consistency in application).  
 184 Note this formulation does not include a public act requirement because Article 4(a) of 
the ICERD requires criminalization of all vilification irrespective of whether the vilification 
took place in public.  The language “reasonably likely in all the circumstances” is intended to 
signify that all of the circumstances surrounding the communication should be taken into 
account in determining if particular conduct incites, promotes or expresses hatred.  It more 
readily accords with a probability, rather than a possibility, of the act inciting hatred against 
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incite (through the expression of insults, slander, acts of 
violence or otherwise) hatred towards,185 serious 
contempt for, severe ridicule, or discrimination of, a 
person or group of persons on the ground of the race of 
the person or members of the group is guilty of an 
offense. 
(2) Any person who threatens physical harm towards, or 
towards any property of, the person or group of persons 
on the ground of the race of the person or members of 
the group, or incites others to threaten physical harm 
towards, or towards any property of, the person or 
group of persons is guilty of an offense. 
(3) Any person who knowingly disseminates ideas based 
on racial superiority or hatred by whatever means is 
guilty of an offense. 
(4) Any person who knowingly participates in 
organizations and activities that promote or incite racial 
hatred or discrimination is guilty of an offense.  
These proposed offenses should be included in the Criminal Code rather 
than as provisions in the RDA.  All four offenses should be created as 
indictable offenses with only the third offense (disseminating ideas) and 
fourth offense (participating in organizations and activities) to be dealt with 
                                                                                                                   
racial groups. The court should consider factors mentioned by the ICERD Committee, 
including the content and form of the speech, the prevailing economic, social, and political 
climate, the position or social status of the speaker in influencing public opinion, the reach of 
the speech, and the objectives of the speech.  See supra notes 52–60.  The NSW Bar 
Association also proposed that the characteristics of the audience to which the words or 
conduct is directed, along with the historical and social context, should be used to determine if 
particular conduct incites hatred under the NSW provision criminalizing serious racial 
vilification under section 20D of the ADA.  See RACIAL VILIFICATION LAW IN NEW SOUTH 
WALES, supra note 92, at 45; cf. Meagher, supra note 1; see also Benesch, supra note 27; 
REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 671.  
 185 Because the incitement requirement has been found to be the major evidentiary 
impediment accounting for the total absence of prosecutions under state laws criminalizing 
serious racial vilification, it might be advisable to substitute the word “incite” with “promote” 
or “express.”  Several participants in a recent NSW parliamentary inquiry proposed this 
language to clarify, and make more accessible, the element of incitement.  Again, the labeling 
is important to ensure a clear communicative exercise in relation to the type and extent of the 
wrongdoing and in giving “fair opportunity” to avoid the wrongdoing in the clear knowledge 
of the proscribed conduct.  See Findlay Stark, It’s Only Words: On Meaning and Mens Rea, 72 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 155, 166 (2013).   
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summarily, unless the prosecution elects otherwise.  The first offense 
involving proscription of the most serious forms of racial vilification through 
hate speech and other violent acts should be strictly indictable.  The second 
offense involving threats of physical harm or harm to property through racial 
speech should be classified as indictable, but to be dealt with summarily 
unless the accused or the prosecution elects for trial on indictment.  The only 
exemptions from liability should be for communications that are true or 
made in good faith.  These exemptions should be specified in precise terms 
rather than the more general defenses of lawful excuse or justification.186  A 
specific defense raised by an accused person would have to be established by 
that person on the balance of probabilities.  The maximum penalty should be 
twelve years imprisonment for the most serious indictable offense, which is 
greater than the penalties for common crimes, such as assault, affray and 
intimidation.187  For lesser offenses in a graded hierarchy, the maximum 
penalties should be proportionately reduced to seven years, four years, and 
three years imprisonment.   
The government should also reform the racial vilification provisions of 
the RDA to complement the criminal law so that less serious instances of 
harmful hate speech can be dealt with through civil mechanisms.  The 
current wording of section 18C of the RDA suffers from both vagueness and 
overbreadth in that it prohibits conduct that is “reasonably likely to offend, 
insult . . . another person or group in public because of their race.”  The 
words “offend” and “insult” should be excised from this provision, as it is 
difficult for courts to determine what constitutes offensive speech.188 
                                                                                                                   
 186 These two proposed specific exemptions parallel two of the defenses contained in the 
Canadian Criminal Code for willful promotion of hatred.  See Criminal Code, supra note 161, 
at s 319(3).  See Meagher, supra note 1, at 131, for reasons why the defenses on public 
interest grounds in the Canadian Criminal Code should not be included as exemptions from 
liability.   
 187 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).  The maximum penalties 
under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) are two-year imprisonment for “common assault,” and ten 
year imprisonment for “affray.”  Id. §§ 61, 93C.  The maximum penalty for “intimidation” is 
five year imprisonment or a fine of fifty penalty units.  Id. § 13.   
 188 The term “offensive” is difficult to define, since its meaning changes with the public 
attitudes and the morality of particular cultures.  See, e.g., Ball v McIntyre, (1966) 9 FLR 237, 
R. v. Butler, (2003) NSWLR 2; Coleman v Power, (2004) 220 CLR 1, Ferguson v Walkley, 
(2008) 17 VR 647; Beck v New South Wales, (2012) NSWSC 1483.  Moreover, offensive 
conduct and language laws provide far too much discretion to law enforcement and judges, as 
well as potentially chilling protected expression because of uncertainty surrounding the type 
of conduct/language that will be considered offensive.  See Luke McNamara & Julia Quilter, 
Turning the Spotlight on ‘Offensiveness’ as a Basis for Criminal Liability, 39 ALTERNATIVE 
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Equally important, as previously noted, none of the international 
instruments regulating racist hate speech require states to disallow offensive 
speech.  In other words, there is no international human right to be free from 
offensive speech.189  As such, the following language should be added, “the 
act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to ridicule, humiliate or 
intimidate, another person or a group of people; and the act is done because 
of the race, colour, or national or ethnic origin of the other person or some or 
all of the people in the group.”  Adding this language to section 18C would 
continue to focus on the impact of the speech on the victim as the main 
element in establishing liability under this section of the RDA rather than on 
objective conceptions of “offensiveness.”  This provides redress for 
particular instances of racial bigotry and intolerance that has a harmful 
impact on the emotional and psychological well-being of individuals and 
groups targeted by the speech.  This would continue to encapsulate the vast 
majority of racial abuse complaints made to the AHRC as most such 
complaints concern material published on the internet, which has highly 
                                                                                                                   
L.J. 36, 37–38 (2014); DAVID BROWN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAWS: MATERIAL AND COMMENTARY 
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCESS OF NSW 520–26, 541–44 (6th ed. 2015); see also Julia 
Quilter & Luke McNamara, Time to Define ‘The Cornerstone of Public Order Legislation’: 
The Elements of Offensive Conduct and Language Under The Summary Offences Act 1988 
(NSW), 36 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 534–37, 540–47, 553–54 (2013) (asserting that the 
enforcement of such laws has a disparate impact on marginalized minority groups, particularly 
Indigenous Australians). 
 189 This approach to offensive speech is consistent with the approach adopted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan stated in the landmark case Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”  This case dealt with 
the constitutionality of an offensive conduct law.  Cohen had been convicted under this law in 
the lower courts for wearing a jacket into a courtroom bearing the words “Fuck the Draft,” 
which were plainly visible.  Id. at 16.  The Supreme Court struck down the offensive conduct 
statute in part because it prohibited a potentially boundless range of speech.  Id. at 25.  Justice 
Harlan was especially concerned that the government might forbid particular words as a 
“convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.”  Id. at 26.  See also Joseph, 
supra note 178.  Australian free speech advocates argue it is difficult for courts to determine 
precisely what constitutes offensive speech, and that vagueness and overbreadth risks chilling 
protected expression.  See Committee Report, supra note 92, at 65–66; Meagher, supra note 1, 
at 236–37.  The current Attorney General, George Brandis, contends offensive speech should 
be protected, stating that “[p]eople do have a right to be bigots you know. . . . In a free country 
people do have rights to say things that others find offensive, insulting or bigoted.”  Richard 
Ackland, George Brandis’ Knot-Twister Over Free Speech, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 
14, 2014), http://www.smh.com/au/comment/George-brandis-knottwister-over-free-speech-20 
140313-34p6q.html.  The Shadow Attorney General, Mark Dreyfus, claimed this approach to 
offensive speech would give a “green light to racist hate speech in Australia.”  Griffiths, supra 
note 177.   
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damaging psychological impacts, but is unlikely to result in physical 
violence.190  The current defenses in section 18D should remain.   
In sum, the myriad aims of laws regulating racial hate speech are more 
likely to be achieved through a multi-pronged approach involving the 
criminal law, civil remedies, conciliation, educational initiatives, and 
strategies to embolden “bystander anti-racism.”191   Federal criminal laws are 
important to target the most severe and deliberate forms of racist hate speech, 
further the symbolic and educational aims of the law, and give a national 
focus to promote uniformity and consistency throughout the country.192 
Civil remedies might be more appropriate in protecting individuals 
against racial bigotry and intolerance in less serious cases of harmful hate 
speech, which have a deleterious impact on the emotional and psychological 
well-being of individuals and groups targeted by the speech.  Conciliation 
might be another tool in the arsenal of the state to address individual 
instances of racial prejudice and intolerance and encourage respectful 
dialogue between different racial groups.  This panoply of measures provides 
latitude for the government to deploy civil or criminal mechanisms to suit the 
actual factual context in particular cases so that less harmful racist hate 
speech can be dealt with through civil remedies rather than the criminal 
law.193  The legislative language must be clear in demarcating between these 
less harmful forms of hate speech to ensure there is a bright line test for what 
conduct should be dealt with by the criminal law as opposed to civil 
remedies.  One should also not underestimate the importance of educational 
initiatives, such as the “Racism: It Stops With Me” National Anti-Racism 
campaign launched by the Australian Human Rights Commission in 2012 to 
raise public awareness of the ongoing problem of racism in Australia and the 
                                                                                                                   
 190 See Triggs, supra note 181; Joseph, supra note 178.  
 191 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 351.  Bystander anti-racism involves actions by individual 
members of society forcefully confronting racism.  Kevin Dunn et al., Submission to the 
National Anti-Racism Partnership & Strategy Discussion Paper 2–4 (2012), available at 
http://www.uws.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/424169/Challenging_Racism_ Project.Sub 
mission_Anti_Racism_Strategy.pdf.  Research has shown that confronting racism at the time 
it occurs benefits the target of the racism and is more likely to stop the racist behavior at the 
time and in the future.  Id. at 4.  Such action can ultimately change existing social norms and 
lessen “false consensus effects,” which occur when the offender overrates societal backing of 
their racist beliefs.  Id. at 5.  Such strategies to empower individuals to confront racism have 
been noticeably lacking in Australia. 
 192 Meagher, supra note 1, at 230–47. 
 193 Id. 
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need for individual members of society to confront racism at the time it 
occurs.194 
B.  State and Territory Laws 
Due to the lack of federal criminal offenses for serious racial vilification, 
the Commonwealth has deferred to the states to assist in satisfying its 
international obligations under the ICCPR and the ICERD.195  There are civil 
and criminal laws prohibiting racial vilification in all jurisdictions in 
Australia except for Tasmania, Western Australia, and the Northern 
Territory.196  Tasmania only has civil laws outlawing racial vilification,197 
and Western Australia relies exclusively on the criminal law to regulate 
racial vilification.198  The Northern Territory has neither civil nor criminal 
racial vilification laws.199   
Those states and territories with civil provisions prohibiting racial 
vilification use variants of the NSW legislation, the first state to adopt a 
comprehensive scheme for racial vilification.200  NSW, along with 
Queensland, South Australia, Victoria, and the Australian Capital Territory 
have made serious vilification a criminal offense within current anti-
discrimination legislation, however, the laws do not form part of the 
consolidated criminal law legislation or the criminal codes of those 
jurisdictions.201  In Queensland, South Australia, and the Australian Capital 
Territory, the laws are substantially similar to the NSW legislation.202   
                                                                                                                   
 194 The campaign recognizes certain priority areas in which racism should be addressed, 
including education, workplaces, sports, services provided by government, online 
communication and the media.  RACISM:  IT STOPS WITH ME, supra note 7, at 4; Dunn et al., 
supra note 191. 
 195 Berman & Anderson, supra note 92. 
 196 REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 670 (providing both the civil and criminal laws 
prohibiting racial vilification in all applicable jurisdictions). 
 197 Id. at 690 (citing Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Tas) s 19). 
 198 Mason, supra note 1, at n.10 (citing Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) schs 
77–80D). 
 199 REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 670. 
 200 Id.  Section 20C(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) makes it unlawful “for a 
person, by a public act, to incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a 
person or group of persons on the ground of the race of the person or members of the group.”   
 201 The NSW legislation includes the same conduct as the civil provision with an added 
element which includes threatening or inciting others to threaten physical harm towards 
people or property.  See Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 20D; see also Mason, supra 
note 1, at 11; Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA) s 4; Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 67; 
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Section 20D of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 provides that an 
act of vilification is criminal if a person by, a public act, “incites hatred 
towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person by threatening 
physical harm towards, or towards any property of, a person or group of 
persons on the basis of race (including ethnic origin).”203  However, the laws 
prohibiting serious/severe vilification have never been enforced to the point 
where a criminal prosecution has commenced. With the exception of the 
Australian Capital Territory, a cumbersome process exists in all of these 
jurisdictions for bringing criminal proceedings under the legislation.204   
Concern over the lack of prosecutions for serious vilification in NSW 
prompted the former Premier of NSW, Barry O’Farrell, to request in 2012 
that the Upper House Standing Committee on Law and Justice conduct an 
inquiry and report on:  
(1) the effectiveness of section 20D of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 which creates the offence of serious 
racial vilification; 
                                                                                                                   
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 131A; Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) 
ss 24–25, cited in Mason supra note 1, at 9.   
 202 In NSW, the Attorney General must consent to the prosecution, and the maximum 
penalty is fifty penalty units, six months imprisonment, or both.  See Anti-Discrimination Act 
1977 (NSW) s 20D.  The monetary penalties under the Queensland legislation are higher, and 
the state Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) must consent to the 
prosecution.  See Anti-Discrimination Act 1991(Qld) s 131A(4).  The monetary penalties 
under the South Australia legislation are lower, and the DPP must consent to the prosecution.  
See Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA) s 4.  The only penalty under the legislation of the 
Australian Capital Territory is fifty penalty units.  See Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 67. 
 203 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 20D. 
 204 The Australian Capital Territory is the only jurisdiction which does not require the 
consent of a crown legal officer (i.e., Attorney General or DPP) to commence criminal 
proceedings.  REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 683.  Even in cases in which an offense 
of serious vilification is believed to have occurred, the statute of limitations and cumbersome 
referral process for consent has precluded prosecution under the relevant law.  For example, in 
Brosnahan v Ronoff (2011) ACAT 439, an offender was found by the Queensland Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal to have engaged in serious gender identity vilification.  The offender 
refused to participate in mediation or conciliation that forms part of the process involved in 
complaints filed with the Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland.  The tribunal member 
hearing the case would have recommended referral to the Attorney General to seek written 
consent to commence criminal proceedings under the Justice Act 1866, but was precluded 
from doing so because the one year statute of limitations under the Act had already expired.  
See Alan Berman, Queensland Harbors Discrimination, QNEWS (Oct. 14, 2011), http:// 
qnews.com.au/article/queensland-harbors-discrimination. 
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(2) whether section 20D establishes a realistic test for the 
offence of racial vilification in line with community 
expectations; and 
(3) any improvements which could be made to section 20D, 
having regard to the continued importance of freedom of 
speech.205 
Notwithstanding twenty-seven public complaints about alleged serious racial 
vilification since 1998, there have been no prosecutions in NSW.206 
Submissions made to the committee by relevant stakeholders expressed 
several concerns.207  First, the lack of prosecutions evidences the law’s 
failure to tackle even the most egregious manifestations of racial hatred and 
harassment, thereby eroding public confidence in the law as well as the 
symbolic and educative208 functions of the law in expressing societal 
disapproval of the most serious forms of racist hate speech.  Second, the 
absence of prosecutions is synonymous with conceding there have been no 
instances of racial vilification worth prosecuting.209  Finally, the lack of 
prosecutions is inconsistent with community attitudes and experiences.210  
The Committee found the complete absence of prosecutions was due in part 
to complicated procedural hurdles in the legislation,211 a lack of knowledge 
on the part of law enforcement about the existence of such offenses, and 
resistance by prosecutors to bring claims for an offense that imposes a higher 
                                                                                                                   
 205 Committee Report, supra note 92, at iv. 
 206 From 1992 to 2013, the DPP received eleven referrals from the President of the Anti-
Discrimination Board, two of which were in turn referred to the police for further 
investigation.  Neither of those two investigations produced sufficient evidence to justify 
prosecution under section 20D.  Id. at 23, n.98. 
 207 Id. at 24–29. 
 208 Id.  The committee concluded the lack of prosecutions hampers the educative purpose of 
the law as there are no prospects for the community to be made aware of the law.  Id. at 28. 
 209 Id. at 23–24. 
 210 Id. at 23–26.  These concerns were articulated in submissions from the Anti-
Discrimination Board, Australian Lawyers Alliance, the Redfern Legal Centre, and the 
Executive Council of Australian Jewry.  Id. at 25.  Some of the inquiry participants viewed the 
absence of prosecutions as evidence of the success of the law as a deterrent.  Id.  The 
committee noted the majority of stakeholders believed section 20D was ineffective.  Id. at 26. 
 211 Id. at 11–12.  The President of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board must investigate a 
complaint of racial vilification and consider whether an offense may have been committed 
under section 20D.  If the President considers there may have been an offense committed, the 
President is to refer the complaint to the NSW Attorney General who may then refer it to the 
DPP to institute criminal proceedings.  Since 1990, the Attorney General has delegated this 
power to the DPP.  Id. at 12. 
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evidentiary burden to prove the elements of the offense.212  In addition, there 
are much lower maximum sentences available than exist for parallel common 
crimes, such as assault, affray, and intimidation.213   
Nevertheless, more general criminal offenses fail to target the racial 
element of the vilification.  For example, if a perpetrator is convicted of a 
general criminal offense, such as assault, and the offense is found to have 
been motivated by racial prejudice or hatred, this is to be taken into account 
as an aggravating factor under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 
(NSW).214  Thus, racial motive may be considered even when it is not a 
specific element of the offense.  As an aggravating factor, the racial motive 
element increases the seriousness of the assault and may lead the court to 
impose a more severe punishment.  Arguably, prosecutors are induced to rely 
upon these “aggravating factors” as a way of dealing with cases involving 
serious racial vilification in the expectation of sentence enhancement.  
However, this reliance weakens the symbolic and educative impact of 
criminalizing such conduct.215  The factors accounting for the ineffectiveness 
                                                                                                                   
 212 Id. at 40–43.  The problem of proving the element of incitement was cited as a major 
reason for the failure to prosecute instances of serious racial vilification under section 20D of 
the legislation. Some suggested using words other than incite, such as promote or express.  Id. 
at 41.  Such words arguably widen the scope of section 20D and are more in line with 
Australia’s obligations under the ICERD.  Others were concerned that changing the language 
would be inconsistent with the language of the ICCPR and the ICERD.  Id.  Reservations were 
also expressed that more permissive language would greatly lower the evidentiary burden and 
interfere too much with freedom of expression.   Id. 
 213 Given the high evidentiary burden for proving all of the elements of the offense, most 
prosecutors pursue general criminal offenses under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)—which has a 
lower evidentiary threshold and carries higher sentences.  See Mason, supra note 10, at 328–
29.  Thus, the maximum punishment available for an offense under section 20D fails to 
proportionately reflect the gravity of the offense.  Committee Report, supra note 92, at 33–35.  
 214 See Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) § 21A(2)(h) (“[T]he offence was 
motivated by hatred for or prejudice against a group of people to which the offender believed 
the victim belonged such as people of a particular religion, racial or ethnic origin, language, 
sexual orientation or age, or having a particular disability.”). 
 215 Committee Report, supra note 92, at 28 (concluding the law’s educative and symbolic 
functions are impeded by the absence of prosecutions as there has been no media coverage 
that would inform the wider community of the existence and purpose of section 20D).  In a 
recently conducted nationwide study on the interpretation and application of sentence 
aggravation provisions in Australia, Gail Mason concluded that the prosecution have too often 
tried to have these provisions applied to offenders from the very minority groups they were 
intended to protect.  Mason, supra note 158, at 308.  Sentence aggravation provisions have 
also been criticized in other jurisdictions due to procedural problems arising from the way in 
which aggravated offenses are pursued by prosecutors.  See Abenaa Owusu-Bempah, 
Prosecuting Hate Crime: Procedural Issues and the Future of Aggravated Offences, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 443 (2015) (suggesting racially and religiously aggravated offences in U.K. 
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of the criminal legislation prohibiting serious racial vilification in NSW 
apply with equal force to Queensland, South Australia and the Australian 
Capital Territory. 
In NSW, the Committee has recommended changes to overcome the 
procedural hurdles to prosecution.216  Recommendations included the referral 
of cases for prosecution directly from the President of the Anti-
Discrimination Board to the NSW police force to investigate possible serious 
vilification and prepare a brief of evidence for the Director of Public 
Prosecution to consider.217  It also recommended that police officers receive 
specific training about the law and that the government increase the time 
period for lodging complaints about alleged criminal offenses from six 
months to a year.218  Instead of advocating an increase in the maximum 
penalties under section 20D to overcome the problem of likely prosecution of 
serious vilification as a common crime, the Committee simply recommended 
that the NSW government review the adequacy of the maximum penalty 
under section 20D, taking into account the maximum penalty for comparable 
general criminal offenses under the Crimes Act 1900.219  The Committee felt 
the procedural recommendations should be implemented first to determine if 
these changes resulted in more prosecutions.220 
Given the numerous procedural and substantive obstacles to prosecution 
of serious racial vilification in all states and territories aside from Western 
Australia,221 the federal government should fulfill its obligations under the 
ICCPR and the ICERD by creating a hierarchy of commonwealth criminal 
offenses in the form previously recommended.  In addition, all state and 
territory criminal laws proscribing serious racial vilification should be 
repealed.  This repeal and replace approach would promote uniformity and 
consistency in application throughout Australia.  In this spirit, Western 
                                                                                                                   
legislation be repealed and replaced with sentencing legislation to deal with hostility-based 
offending).  
 216 Committee Report, supra note 92, at 85, 88, 92–93. 
 217 Id. at 92. 
 218 Id. at 85, 180. 
 219 Id. at 73. 
 220 Id. at 61. 
 221 Western Australia is the only jurisdiction to incorporate the offense of racial vilification 
into its Criminal Code.  See Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) schs 77–80D.  
Western Australia has also imposed greater penalties for certain criminal offenses when 
committed in circumstances of racial aggravation, and remains the only jurisdiction in which 
there has been a successful prosecution under state or territory legislation.  See REES, RICE & 
ALLEN, supra note 101, at 683, 686; Raphael, supra note 105. 
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Australia and the Northern Territory would need to adopt civil provisions 
rendering racial vilification unlawful consistent with the NSW legislation.  
Similarly, the civil provisions in the commonwealth RDA should remain 
operative concurrently with state and territory civil law remedies.222  
V.  CONCLUSION 
There are numerous reasons justifying the creation of specific hate crime 
offenses under federal criminal laws to address serious racial vilification.  
Racial hate speech undercuts the basic principles of equality and non-
discrimination that underpin international human rights law.  Human rights 
are intended to co-exist with and supplement the right to freedom of 
expression. Restrictions on racial hate speech facilitate rather than impede 
freedom of expression by disallowing speech that is likely to silence the free 
speech rights of the targeted group.   
The UNHRC has consistently recognized that racial hate speech is not 
protected by Article 19 of the ICCPR.  Indeed, domestic laws prohibiting the 
communication of racist ideas likely to expose a person to discrimination, 
hostility, or violence are required by Article 20(2) of the ICCPR.  The 
ICERD further requires states to pass domestic legislation criminalizing the 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to 
racial hatred, contempt or discrimination (through the expression of insults, 
ridicule, slander or otherwise), threats or incitement to violence as well as 
prohibiting assistance to racist activities (including financing). 
Beyond establishing criminal offenses for these activities, Australia will 
have an on-going duty to effectively enforce any such criminal legislation.  
As the ICERD Committee held in Jewish Community of Oslo v. Norway, a 
failure to convict a person under domestic criminal laws for statements 
                                                                                                                   
 222 See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.  The commonwealth RDA establishes a 
lower evidentiary burden than state civil laws regulating racist hate speech by focusing on the 
emotional impact of the speech on the targeted individual or group.  By contrast, the state and 
territory laws require the public act “incite” racial hatred towards the targeted individual or 
group.  The incitement requirement is concerned with the impact of the speech on third 
parties.  See REES, RICE & ALLEN, supra note 101, at 628–56.  The state and territory civil 
provisions arguably take away more permissible rights granted by the commonwealth RDA to 
bring a civil claim for racial vilification.  Section 6A(2) of the RDA was inserted to overcome 
this aspect of possible direct inconsistency arising from commonwealth and state and territory 
laws regulating race discrimination.  See RDA 1992, supra note 69, § 6A(2).  This provision 
prevents individuals from filing a complaint of unlawful discrimination under the RDA if they 
have already lodged a complaint under state or territory law.  
102 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:45 
 
 
involving ideas based on racial superiority or hatred as well as incitement to 
racial discrimination, if not violence, constitutes a violation of Articles 4 and 
6 of the ICERD.  Moreover, Australia should withdraw its ongoing 
reservations to Article 20(2) of the ICCPR and Article 4(a) of the ICERD 
and enact commonwealth criminal offenses along the lines previously 
recommended to fulfil its obligations under both treaties.  Failure to pass 
such legislation weakens the Australian government’s claim to be a law-
abiding nation concerned with promoting international norms governing the 
regulation of racist hate speech.   
As hate crime expert Gail Mason aptly points out, the federal government 
often responds to claims of racism and racist violence with denial; a tactic 
which in part maintains “Australia’s image as a good global citizen.”223  This 
indifference to the experiences of racial minorities ultimately hampers the 
success of crime prevention and other strategies to address societal racism.224 
Australia must do more than merely pay lip service to important international 
treaty obligations governing the regulation of racial hate speech if it is to be 
taken seriously by the international community as a nation intent on 
addressing the most serious forms of racist hate speech.   
It is apparent that under international treaty obligations and fundamental 
human rights principles, including the right to dignity and equality, there is a 
significant void in the Australian criminal law in relation to severe forms of 
racial hate speech.  The main justifications put forward in support of freedom 
of speech do not actually justify protecting speech that incites racial 
discrimination, hatred, and violence.  To empower racial minorities to live in 
the Australian community free from the fear of hostility and severe forms of 
violence, there must be specific criminal offenses in relation to racial hate 
speech alongside the existing civil complaint mechanisms through anti-
discrimination legislation.  
It is important that federal legislation grades criminal offenses in a 
hierarchy of seriousness, analogous to the way in which anti-terrorism 
offenses are graded in the Commonwealth Criminal Code.  This would give 
national prominence to the issue of racially motivated hate speech and reflect 
the seriousness with which it is viewed by the Australian community.  
Significantly, there must be a strictly indictable offense of “severe racial 
vilification” punishable by a significant period of imprisonment to 
demonstrate the substantial wrong of this type of conduct.  Then, as there is a 
                                                                                                                   
 223 Mason, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 224  Id. at 51–52. 
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distinct graded hierarchy of conduct, circumstances, and consequences in 
which racial hated speech is criminalized, there should be a logical and 
incremental categorization down to the offense of disseminating ideas based 
on racial superiority and racial hatred through any form of communication.  
These lower level types of offenses can usually be dealt with summarily in 
magistrate courts.   
Australia prides itself as a multicultural democratic society tolerant and 
understanding of cultural diversity.  Consequently, legal reform is both long 
overdue and urgently needed.  The robust law reforms recommended in this 
Article will help provide greater assurances to racial minorities living in the 
Australian community that their fundamental human rights of dignity and 
equality are appropriately recognized and protected.  As a result, they can 
live in a cohesive society free from the fear of hostility and violence arising 
from perplexing racial hatred and discrimination. 
  
 
